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Contemporary food security concerns in sub-Saharan Africa centre on the pertinence of 
food versus fuel forms of production. As the global energy market enters into the post-
fossil-fuel epoch, the demand on land for commercial biofuel and feedstock production 
threatens the livelihood of sub-Saharan Africa's sizeable peasant community. This paper 
examines the theoretical and paradigmatic attributes of the human security and food 
security rubric, and its pertinence in accounting for the social threats which threaten 
individuals within an increasingly interconnected global economic system. While the 
emergence of these neologisms of the critical security studies school represent a marked 
divergence from that of the traditional approach of understanding security threats, they 
remained mired in contestation due to their lack of theoretical parsimony. This paper 
attempts to redress these contestations by accounting for human and food insecurity 
through a materialist framework of analysis. It is argued that the paradigms relevance lies in 
its ability to account for structural forms of violence; a violence superlative within 
imperialist relations. Human insecurity is thus endemic to the structural relations and 
structural inequalities of the global capitalist system. Through the integration of human 
security and Marxian agrarian political economy, the paradigm's academic relevance is truly 
revealed. As such the contemporary debate surrounding food insecurity and land 
expropriation for biofuel production must be understood in terms of the historical 
usurpation of structural violence upon the highly vulnerable individual. The paper attempts 
to frame sub-Saharan Africa's human insecurity as the historical product of agrarian 
commodification. An analysis of Tanzania's agrarian dynamics demonstrates the pertinence 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the contemporary global economy has precipitated a rescaling of 
economic space. It denotes a degree of denationalization regarding the manner in which 
economic activity, and many of the spillovers thereof, become increasingly interregional and 
multicontinental; "transcending the bounded national economic space."l Whilst the growing 
interdependence of states within an integrated economic system produces a global division 
of labour, economic differentiation and functional integration, the spillovers of such 
developments are felt well outside the economic spheres of society. Within this context, 
scholarly and policy endeavour relating to security threats has been mired by contestation. 
In essence this contestation is reflected in the debate between critical security studies of the 
post-Cold War era, and the predecessor of the realist or traditional approach to security 
studies. Under the former, the rubric of human security has emerged. Supposedly, the 
analytical coherence of the paradigm resides in its ability to account for threats which 
transcend the state-centric militaristic notion of security. Emphasis is placed on the security 
of the individual, rather than that of the territorial sovereignty of the state. 
This dissertation explores the merits and pitfalls of the human and food security paradigm. 
This delineation will be undertaken through a critical theory framework of analysis. The 
critical theory approach emphasises the need to broaden the approach taken towards 
threats and rejects the primacy of state-centric notions of security. The approach adopts a 
materialist account of insecurity, utilising Marxian political economy to critique global 
capitalism's role in engendering individual insecurity.2 This is in part due to what Ake terms 
the contradictory evolution of global capitalism. Whilst the spread of global capitalism 
creates uniformities regarding "efficient" economic practices and policies, the process is 
also mired by a tendency to fragment, differentiate and marginalize the weaker social forces; 
forces which are often exploited in order to advance capitalist accumulation.3 According to 
Salih, this primarily due to the manner in which market elements of neo-liberal globalization 
1 McGrew, A. 2007. "Introduction", in McGrew, A. and Poku, N. (eds.), Globalization, Development and Human Security 
(Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 4 
2 Lawson, S. 2003. International Relations (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 88 
3 Nabudere, D. 200. "Globalization, the African Post-colonial State, Post-Traditionalism and the New World Order" in 











are more resolute with the security of financial institutions and corporate interests than 
that of the human security ramifications thereof.4 
At the outset, it is argued that human security remains a paradigm within international 
relations enquiry; and not a theory. As a paradigm it thus does not possess theoretical 
parsimony. However, this does not render the paradigm ineffectual as an academic tool. 
Secondly, an attempt will be made to delineate some of the paradigms core merits. Thirdly, 
it will be argued that the human security paradigm is rendered more theoretically robust 
when addressed from a materialist perspective. The paradigm strengths lies in its ability to 
account for Johan Galtung's notion of structural violenceS, which is embedded within 
capitalist relations. The final two chapters attempt to delineate how structural violence is 
embedded within contemporary food insecurity concerns within sub-Saharan Africa and 
Tanzania, respectively. Concurrently, food security concerns within the agrarian setting of 
sub-Saharan Africa centre on the food-versus-fuel debate. Diminishing fossil-fuel reserves 
coupled with changing global dietary patterns and increased emphasis on biofuel 
production is argued to be contributing to increased demand pressure on arable land. 
Within the agrarian setting of sub-Saharan Africa, these dynamics threaten the livelihood of 
smallholder agrarian livelihoods. 
It is argued that food security concerns are the manifestation of structural violence, 
engendered through the historical process of the commodification of agrarian relationships. 
Emphasis is placed upon how food insecurity emerges as a result of the historical 
subordination and domination of the peasantry. The legacy and continuation of food and 
human insecurity faced by the peasantry remains a product of lithe relations of exploitation 
engendered by imperialist domination of the small peasant, mediated through local 
classes ... ,,6 The peasantry's entitlement to specific livelihood patterns is slowly threatened, 
via a IIreproductive squeeze", as the peasantry is increaSingly integrated into agro-industrial 
relations. 
4 Salih, M. 2001. Globalization and Human Insecurity in Africa, in Assefa, T. et ai, (eds.) Globalization, Democracy and 
Development in Africa: Challenges and Prospects. (Addis Ababa: OSSREA), pp. 65 
5 Galtung, J. 1969. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", Journal of Peace Research, 6(3) 
6 Shivji, I. 1992. "The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective", in Foster. P. and Maghimbi, s. 











1.1 A Paradigm and Theory 
At the outset of this paper it seems necessary to delineate what constitutes a paradigm, and 
what distinguishes a paradigm from that of an international relations theory. The distinction 
remains significant for the subsequent argument as much of the contestation around the 
human security rubric relates to its parsimony as a theoretical tool; both in scholarly and 
policy disciplines. The debate to follow deals primarily with the former of these domains. 
Theory within international relations is regarded as possessing research guiding properties 
and operates as a prudent framework for the simplification of observable facts. In many 
regards it is the adoption of the positivist methodology of the purely scientific realm into 
that of the social sciences. At a narrow level Stephen van Evera defines theories as "general 
statements that describe and explain the causes or effects of classes of phenomena. They 
are composed of causal laws or hypotheses, explanations and antecedent conditions."7 
While theories can be either explanatory, normative or prescriptive in nature, they maintain 
these general dynamics or functions. In addition, theories serve to "improve our analytical 
competences ... question or challenge our world views."s Whether the prescriptive dynamics 
of the theory focus attention on actors, processes or structures, international relations 
theories can serve to extrapolate an explanation for the constitution, or dimensions of data, 
by placing these in perspective. 
Undoubtedly the most significant discussion of the paradigm can be found in The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, despite the contestation that surrounds the applicability of this 
term. Written in 1962, Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions attempts to 
demarcate the development, practice and history of modern science. Various authors have 
attempted to utilize the writings of Thomas Kuhn within the fields of political science and 
sociology. According to David Hollinger the publication of the book has been momentous 
due to its subsequent application in answering a variety of questions in various fields of 
inquiry outside the purely scientific realm. Firstly, Kuhn's writings have become 
monumental in answering IIhow, if at all, can Kuhn's sense of historical development can 
enrich political, cultural, and intellectual history and other fields outside the history of 
7 J(Ilrgensen, E. 2010. International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 10 











sCience?,,9 Secondly, questions have been asked about the normative implications of Kuhn's 
"philosophy of science-his sense of validity" and the manner in which these tenets can be 
utilized in improving the quality of knowledge produced outside the scientific realm. While 
Kuhn's writings were explicitly concerned with the natural science he himself nonetheless 
perceived his insights as relevant to sociology and the social psychology of scientists. lO 
According to Hollinger, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions excites the imagination of 
working historians chiefly because much of what is says about scientific communities seems 
to apply so strikingly to other kinds of communities."l! 
Kuhn's understanding ofthe nature and historiography of scientific inquiry has subsequently 
become a "methodological postulate" for understanding the history of inquiry within other 
non-scientific communities.12 Central to Kuhn's philosophy of science was the notion that 
effective scientific inquiry was highly dependent upon the use of paradigms.13 According to 
Kuhn, a paradigm has two central characteristics. Firstly, a paradigm is "sufficiently 
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity." Secondly, it is sufficiently "open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for 
the refined group of practitioners to resolve.,,14 Kuhn subsequently distinguished between 
two senses of paradigms: the "disciplinary matrix", which consists of "the entire set of 
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" and; 
"exemplars" the exact, "concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, 
can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science."lS The former of these two has gained limited merit within the discipline of political 
science. The exact definition of a paradigm within Kuhn's work has been subject to such 
incongruity that as many as twenty-one different ambiguous uses of the term have been 
found within the 1962 text.16 Nonetheless, according to Janos the normative implications of 
the Kuhnian paradigm is that paradigms operate as constructs for identifying broad 
9 Hollinger, D. 1973. "T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History", The American Historical Review, 78(2), 
pp.371 
10 Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (London: The University of Chicago Press), pp. 8 
11 Hollinger, D. 1973. "T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History", pp. 371 
12 Ibid, pp. 373 
13 Janos, A. 1986. Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science (California: Stanford University 
Press), pp. 1 
14 Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 10 
15 Hollinger, D. 1973. "T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History", pp. 373 
16 Foster-Carter, A. 1976. "From Rustow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment", 











relationships between multiple categories, together with some underlying presuppositions 
regarding the nature of the larger world. Defined in this manner, paradigms "are not 
theories, for they do not provide explanations only instructions as to where to go for 
explanations ... they allow us to organize research and, by structuring intellectual curiosity, 
provide an appropriate focus for scientific disciplines.,,17 Thus, paradigms are essential in 
creating a foci point for initial scientific inquiry.is They operate, often even unconsciously, as 
a "pre-theoretical entity, a set of domain assumptions which in a very strong sense serve to 
define the field of study.,,19 
For Kuhn the use of such paradigms and "of the more esoteric type of research it permits is 
a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific field.,,20 The paradigm is seen as 
"a model from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.,,2l When 
scientists "disagree about whether the fundamental problems of their field have been 
solved, the search for rules gains a function that it does not ordinarily possess. While 
paradigms remain secure, however, they can function without agreement over 
rationalization or without any attempted rationalization at all."22 However, the road from a 
paradigm towards a firm research consensus is "extraordinarily arduous.,,23 Of concern to 
Kuhn was the process by which paradigmatic traditions lost their constituencies. Since 
paradigms are largely disciplines of a specific time, transition from one tradition to another 
was likely to occur within the historical progression of science. The notions of "anomaly," 
"crisis," and "paradigm-shift" (or "revolution") are all elements which Kuhn foresaw as part 
of the process by which paradigmatic traditions would encounter change.24 For Kuhn, the 
scientific community is often reluctant to abandon the preceding paradigm. Bound by 
emotion and obstinate intellectual commitment, the scientific community may eventually 
"lose faith and then consider alternatives, [but] they do not renounce the paradigm that has 
led them to crisis. They do not, that is, treat anomalies as counterinstances.,,25 For Kuhn, a 
community may eventually go through the full cycle of "(i) secure tradition, (2) novelty and 
17 Janos, A. 1986. Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science, pp. 1 
18 Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 27 
19 Foster-Carter, A. 1976. "From Rustow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment", pp. 
168 
20 Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 11 
21 Ibid, pp. 10 
22 I bid, pp. 49 
23 Ibid, pp. 15 
24 Hollinger, D. 1973. "T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History", pp. 374 











confusion, (3) disagreement over whether to resist innovation or encourage it, and if the 
latter, in what direction, (4) coalescence around certain candidate that might become (5) 
another secure tradition.,,26 
For certain academics27 an application of Kuhn to the "imperfect knowledge" disciplines of 
social science is to encourage the imposition of arbitrary and tight research consensuses on 
disciplines so as to make it appear a nearer approximate to the natural sciences.28 Since 
Kuhn is concerned with the natural sciences, an application of his provocative ideas to the 
social sciences are likely to be problematic in principle. These concerns lie beyond the scope 
of discussion but nonetheless deserve some mention. For Kuhn, the social sciences existed 
in a pre-paradigm situation.29 While he saw the pre-paradigm stage and paradigm stage as 
different he nonetheless notes that the competing pre-paradigm stages are "guided by 
something much like a paradigm.,,3o Within the realm of natural sciences, Kuhn saw 
paradigms as defined by their predecessors. According to Aider Foster-Carter, Kuhn's 
depiction of paradigm development was such that once the history of a science had begun 
with the founding of the ruling paradigm, "its development proceeds diachronously: there is 
one (and only one) paradigm, until with the emergence of an anomaly this is replaced 
(without any sort interregnum) by another paradigm, and so on.,,31 This postulation is vastly 
different to the social sciences, where no one paradigm has acquired complete overarching 
saliency. 
26 Hollinger, D. 1973. "T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History", pp. 374 
27 Hill, L. and Eckberg, D. 1979. "The Paradigm Concept and Sociology: A Critical Review", American Sociological Review, 
44(6) 
28 Hollinger, D. 1973. ''1.5. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History", pp. 384 
29 Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. x 
30 Ibid, pp. xi 













While Kuhn's use ofthe paradigm was intended for the natural sciences, the use ofthe term 
"paradigm" as a cognitive pre-theoretical device is argued to be pertinent to any heuristic 
endeavour. While not a theory, a paradigm may be defined as a set of basic beliefs (or 
metaphysics) that deals with the first principles; a "worldview that defines for its holder, the 
nature of the world and the individuals place in it.,,32 The subsequent debate will attempt to 
give credence to the paradigm of human and food security; and the manner in which it 
possess the two central elements of the Kuhnian paradigm. 
32 Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research", in Denzin, N and Lincoln, Y. (eds.), Handbook of 











Chapter 2: The Historical Background and Paradigmatic Attributes of Human and Food 
Security 
The superfluity of literature pertaining to the human security paradigm prevents a full 
account of its numerous conceptualizations and critiques. At a broad level of abstraction 
this has been elicited by the ontological, epistemological, and normative 
multidimensionality of the rubric itself. While the general impetus of the current debate 
pertains to food security concerns, it is nonetheless necessary to delineate some of the core 
paradigmatic attributes, both positive and negative, of the overarching rubric that is human 
security. 
2.1 The Antecedents and Attributes of Human Security 
The phrase "human security" is most commonly associated with the 1994 Human 
Development Report on human security, drafted and campaigned by Mahbub ul Haq. The 
central impetus of the report was to forward the centr l normative freedoms of the United 
Nations; that of "freedom from want" and "freedom from feaL" The report acknowledged 
that the founders of the United Nations had entitled favour to the latter of these two 
components, a judgment which had predicated the dominance of state-centric military 
interpretations of national security.33 The neologism of human security proposed within the 
1994 Report supposedly marked a divergence away from the traditionalist state-centric 
notion of security. According to the 1994 Human Development Report: 
For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for 
conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to 
a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their 
security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries 
about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, 
income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime -
these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.34 
33 UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 24 











At a fundamental level, the human security concept seeks to redress the essential notion of 
whom is protected and how that protection is afforded. The approach takes individuals, 
rather than states, as the referent object for security, and does so in a manner which 
emphasises a holistic, long-term view of security that seeks to acknowledge structural 
inequalities.35 According to the 1994 Report, the attainment of human security is dependent 
upon two dynamics; "The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. 
The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want.,,36 
Accordingly, the proclamation would suggest that freedom from fear is intended to indicate 
freedom from violence, while the freedom from want phrase would suggest freedom from 
poverty. In addition to the above the 1994 report made several other assertions regarding 
the four central attributes of human security. Firstly, human security is conceived as a 
"universal concern" in as much as these concerns are common to all of the worlds people. 
Secondly, the components of human security are interdependent as the consequences of 
these concerns travel the globe. Thirdly, human security is "easier to ensure through early 
prevention" of its upstream threats than via latter intervention. Finally, human security is 
people centred and is concerned with the ability of people to exercise choices and their 
access to market and social opportunities.37 As the report itself notes, the definition of 
human security is seen as distinct from notions of human developmenes as defined within 
the preceding Human Development Report. While these concepts are seen as distinct it is 
nonetheless acknowledged that th y are linked. The key premises of the 1994 UNDP Report 
developed this definition of human security in relation to several dimensions of economic, 
food, health, environmentat personal, community, and political security.39 
The 1994 UNDP Report lists the aforementioned threats and notes, one of the key problems 
with the notion of human security is that "human security is most easily identified through 
its absence than its presence.,,40 While each dimension of the human security concept is 
delineated within the report, the notion of human security and its interdependent 
35 Hendricks, C. 2006. "From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building 
Challenges", Institute for Security Studies, No. 122, p. 3 
36 UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report, pp. 24 
37 Ibid, pp. 23 
38 Human Development is defined as the process of widening the range of people's choices. 
39 UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report, pp. 25 











constitutive elements have been subject to much critique because consensus is yet to be 
reached on the core values of the terms. 
Subsequent to the 1994 UNDP Report various attempts have been made to offer a more 
scholarly precise definition of human security. This has been done not only in an attempt to 
provide an operational sense of the term, but also a more precise theoretical framework. A 
central problem with this endeavour is the broad nature of the rubric of human security. It is 
important to note that human security has both qualitative and quantitative aspects. At one 
level the notion of human security is concerned with the ability of the individual to attain 
the basic material needs. At another level the notion of human security pertains to a moral 
dimension concerning the achievement of human dignity. This dimension relates to a more 
moral-philosophical dimension regarding the personal autonomy of the individual. 41 
During the year 2000 Kofi Annan delineated the following broad description of human 
security: 
Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than absence of 
violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to 
education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities 
and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step 
towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. 
Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of future generations to 
inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated bUilding 
blocks of human - and therefore national- security.42 
This multidimensionality has entailed that the paradigm has been further extrapolated and 
propagated based upon the following four perspectives. The human rights perspective has 
given credence to the normative elements of the framework, believing that the protection 
of basic liberties is of the foremost importance for the attainment of human security. The 
feminist perspective utilises the term to challenge the patriarchal nature of the traditionalist 
approach towards security studies and security structures. The developmentalist literature 
41 Thomas, C. 1999. "Introduction", in Wilkin, P. And Thomas, C. (eds.), Globalization, Human Security, and the African 
Experience (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 3 
42 Annan, K. 2000. "Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia." Two-Day 












has tended to utilise the paradigm in tandem with the notion of human development, 
despite criticism regarding the conflation of the two terms; since development is the 
creation of choices and human security is the ability in exercising specific choices. This 
approach does not rank the priorities of human security but sees the threats to human life 
as wide and varying.43 The globalist perspective places human security within the context of 
global security, whereby the latter can not be achieved in isolation from the former, and 
visa versa. The perspective places much emphasis on the role of the global governance 
structure for the attainment of this goal, which in itself has been subject to much 
contestation. Albeit, the four above mentioned perspectives have attempted to utilize the 
paradigm of human security, a Marxist perspective of the term remains grossly 
underrepresented within the present literature. Nonetheless, consensus and coherence is 
yet to be reached due to the severe breadth and depth of the term human security. 
Consensus regarding the core values of the paradigm remain elusive and have been the 
topic of various scholarly endeavours to offer a more theoretically robust and sound 
delineation of the concept. 
2.2 The Antecedents and Attributes of Food Security 
Food security falls within the broader rubric of human security. The prominence of the 
concept can be traced back to the 1975 World Food Conference. During this period, the 
pertinence of the concept was strongly related to the global shortfall in world food 
production following a spike in global oil prices in the early 1970's. The first official 
definition of food security was published in 1974 and defined the concept as lithe availability 
at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady 
expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices."44 At 
this outset the notion of food security entailed avoiding transitory shortfalls in the 
aggregate supply of food.4s According to Staatz, the realization that inadequate levels of 
global food supply is not the sole cause of famine has contributed significantly to the 
43 Akokpari, J. 2007. "The Political Economy of Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa", Visiting Research Fellow (VRF), 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Series no. 431, (Japan: JETRO), pp. 5 
44 Patel, R. 2009. "Grassroots Voices: Food Sovereignty", The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(3), pp. 664 
45 Staatz, J. (et.al.) 1990. "Measuring Food Security in Africa: Conceptual, Empirical, and Policy Issues", American Journal of 











broadening of the concept post-1970.46 Such an account of food security had its genesis in 
Amartya Sen's Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation written in 
1981. The book extrapolated a debate for an account of famine based upon unequal access 
and inequalities built into the global food distribution mechanism, rather than the transitory 
shortfall account. Thus, food security has evolved to incorporate the chronic problems of 
inadequate access and unequal distribution at global and domestic levels. 
According to Raj Patel the concept emerged during the epoch of the Sahelian famine, the 
zenith of demands for a New International Economic Power, and the peak of Third Worldist 
power. The contemporary neo-liberal era has entailed lithe widening Gyre of food 
security.,,47 According to the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food 
security is defined as "a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, 
social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
needs and food preferences for a healthy and active Iife.,,48 The notion of food security does 
not, however, entail food self-sufficiency; the ability of a country to meet its domestic food 
needs through domestic production. Food security refers to the ability of individuals at the 
household level to obtain the required amount of food, whether this is produced locally or 
imported. The concept thus remains particularly complex due to the varying dimensions of 
food security, both at intra- and inter-national levels. 
Concurrently, the definition of food security is dependent upon four dimensions of the 
concept. Food availability, "the availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate 
quality, supplied through domestic production imports (including food aid); food access, 
"access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements49) for acquiring appropriate 
foods; utilization, "through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation, and health care to reach 
a state of nutritional well-being where all psychological needs are met"; stability, "access to 
adequate food at all times."so The multiple dimensions of food security, as outlined above, 
are indeed far from clear cut and remain mired in academic contestation. A further 
46 Staatz, J. (et.a!.) 1990. "Measuring Food Security in Africa: Conceptual, Empirical, and Policy Issues", pp. 1311 
47 Patel, R. 2009. "Grassroots Voices: Food Sovereignty", pp. 664 
48 Tibaijuka, A. 2004. "Food Security in Africa: Agriculture, Trade, and the Environment", New Economy, 11(3), pp. 170 
49 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. 1996. "Food Security", Policy Brie! June 2006, Issue 2. p. 1 According 
to the FAD, entitlements are defined as "a set of all commodity bundles over which a person can establish command given 
the legal, political, economic and social arrangements of the community in which they live (including traditional rights such 












dimension of the concept has emerged more recently. Under the leadership of Via 
Cam pesina at the World Food Summit of 1996 the notion of "food sovereignty" was 
introduced as a central component of food security. Accordingly, food sovereignty entailed 
the normative "right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its 
basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity." Critically, Patel notes that this 
element continues the trend to evade discussions regarding the parameters of social and 
economic control within the international food system. 51 
In light of the above, food security is said to have undergone three paradigmatic shifts. 
According to Simon Maxwell the conceptual development of food security is related to 
specific historical phases.52 The first paradigm shift centred upon a shift of focus on food 
supply from the global and national level to the household and individual. Occurring 
between 1975-85, the shift prescribes that it is no longer possible to speak of food security 
as a problem of merely supply, without reference to dynamics of entitlement and access. 
Subsequently it is more usual to define food security as the problem of access, "with food 
production as the best route to entitlement, either directly for food producers, or indirectly 
by driving market prices down for consumers.,,53 Contestation remains as to whether the 
household or individual should take precedence as the unit of analysis. The stress within the 
subsequent debate will be on the individual access as it holds greater congruency with 
current definitions, the rubric of human security and the subsequent materialist account 
thereof. 
The second shift concerns a shift from a food-first perspective to a livelihood perspective. 
Post 1985 food security has come to incorporate the notion of livelihood security. According 
to Steffano Ponte the notion of livelihood as it relates to food security concerns, is 
conceptualised as "the assets (natura" physical, human, financial and social capitalL the 
activities, and the access to these (mediated by the institutions and social relations) that 
together determine the living gained by the individual or household.,,54 The paradigm shift 
dictates that we see livelihood security as "a necessary and often sufficient condition for 
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food security./155 This view entails a long-term focus whereby the individual or household is 
seen as a reproductive and productive unit. Such a view has been further discussed in the 
contestation surrounding the impact of cash versus food crops, and the impact therefore on 
the resilience and sensitivity of the unit. 
The third and final shift of the conceptual development of the food security rubric has 
entailed a movement away from objective indicators towards subjective perception. The 
former of these dynamics centres on the manner in which poverty literature has favoured 
objective conditions and variables of deprivation. 56 Such variables include the target 
consumption levels and nutritional intakes. The objective dynamics have been subject to 
criticisms regarding their true objective nature, since they remain the product value 
judgements and, in their quantitative form, fail to acknowledge subjective qualitative 
dynamics regarding the food quality, the consistency with local cultural acceptability, 
human dignity and other dynamics of "feelings of deprivation./157 Subjective assessment has 
subsequently become heavily embedded within the conceptual framework of food security. 
As a result of these paradigmatic shifts since the mid-1970's, food security has become 
concerned with the complexities of "livelihood strategies in difficult and uncertain 
environments, and how people themselves resp nd to perceived risks and uncertainties./158 
2.3 The Contextualization of Human and Food Security 
Placing the concept of human security within its historical and theoretical contexts aids in 
abetting some of the merits and demerits of its use. The concepts of human and food 
security have not emerged within a vacuum. In many ways it has gained a strong degree of 
intellectual currency due to its liability to better account for existing realities./159 Both have 
had dual uses as academic approaches and fledgling policy movements. As an academic 
approach, human security and its constituents represents the deviation away from the 
"traditional/1 approach towards the concept of security in the discipline of international 
relations. 
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The emergence of human security, and a refined notion of security, whilst commonly cited 
as a product of the 1994 Human Development Report, can in fact be traced back to the 
growing dissatisfaction with the dominant notions of both development and security in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. According to Kanti Bajpai, Marxian economic critiques led the way 
in their analysis of dominant models of economic development in the 1960s.60 The response 
therefore was that during the 1970s the Club of Rome published a series of volumes on the 
"world problematique" which acknowledged that there is "a complex of problems troubling 
men of all nations." These concerns have to be placed within the context of a complex 
global system which impinges upon the individual's life chances, particularly "accelerated 
industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-
renewable resources, and a deterioration of environment.,,61 In the 1980s two further 
commissions contributed to the changing thinking about development and security. The first 
was the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, which issued the 
so-called "North-South Report." The second commission of the 1980s was the Independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which drew attention to the manner in 
which Third World security was increasingly threatened by "poverty and deprivation, by 
economic inequality.,,62 
While these commissions remain relatively trivial they were nonetheless part of a growing 
consensus and call for new thinking in security matters. The post-Cold War era and the 
proliferation of globalisation has earmarked the dissolution of the primacy of a state-centric 
militaristic notion of security. Globalisation necessitates that the international system no 
longer be characterised exclusively by states due to the vast number non-state actors which 
currently dominate the international system. 63 These developments have thrust new 
"threats" into the centre of the security debate. Barry Buzan's literature remains the most 
seminal in addressing this new-fangled security environment. Despite belonging to the 
Copenhagen school of security studies, Buzan cites the altered post-Cold War environment 
as necessitating a shift in the security agenda. Buzan draws upon Galtung's A Structural 
Theory of Imperialism to capture the hierarchy of this post-war North-South era, whereby. 
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the centre has become more dominant over the periphery.64 According to Buzan, security 
centres upon the fundamental notion of survival of human collectives and thus includes a 
variety of dimensions related to the conditions of existence. While there is an emphasis 
towards a state-centric unit of analysis for security concerns, human collectives are affected 
by a myriad of politica" economic, societal and environmental threats.65 
Sabine Alkire contests that the altered security environment can be represented by 
superimposing three contemporary alterations upon the security environment: empirica" 
analytical, and institutional. 66 These dynamics have been extensively discussed and are not 
of much importance within the scope of this paper, but nonetheless deserve some mention. 
Empirically, observable changes to the nature of security threats include the manner in 
which conflict itself is increasingly intra-state in its dimension. Moreover, population 
pressures and increased consumerism continue to contribute towards increased concerns 
regarding ecological insecurity, increased immigration, and increased pressures upon the 
remaining sustainable water and energy sources. The resultant dynamics of economic crises, 
increases in global inequality, global drug-resistant pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, 
international criminal activity, and conflicts across gender, class, and religious cleavages has 
placed greater pressures upon the already fragile and destitute social groups of the global 
village. 67 While these security threats vary in their supposed size and depth, they 
nonetheless remain extant stresses in the global security landscape, particularly within the 
sub-Saharan Africa. While security is about survival, it is also concerned with the "conditions 
of existence.,,68 These dynamics rightly produce the need for a conceptual tool which can be 
utilized to aid in "insights of interlinkages" between the international and the domestic 
realm.69 Analytically, the concept of human security has emerged largely as a theoretica" 
qualitative, an quantitative means to produce insights that can be utilized to leverage the 
potential safety of individuals. At the heart of this endeavour is the desire to illustrate many 
of the interrelationships within the post-Cold War security landscape. While the relationship 
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between many of these variables remains mired in complexity, there is nonetheless a 
considerable benefit from addressing interrelated variables holistically. 70 Finally the notion 
of human security has also emerged out of various institutional reconfigurations and 
capabilities within the post-Cold War world. 
2.4 The Critique of the Orthodox and Human Security Approach 
Within the discipline of international relations the term security has for a long time been 
synonymous with the notion of "national security." From its Westaphalian extraction, 
national security refers to the protection of the state from external threats and has its roots 
in the emergence of the modern nation-state of seventeenth century Europe. 71 
Theoretically, this perspective has been framed based upon realist tenets, whereby states 
are held as the key referent object for the analysis of security threats. Within the context of 
Cold War bipolarity, threats were perceived as external pressures to the territorial integrity 
of the state. Military response, or threat thereof, was largely acknowledged as the key 
mechanism of deterrent, defence, and invariably, peace. The orthodox security approach 
remains heavily premised upon a realist account of the international system. As such the 
realist premises remain central. Firstly, within the anarchical nature of the global self-help 
system, no state can be guaranteed security, regardless of inter-state alliances. The core 
assumption of the universal rationality of state actors entails inevitable convergence around 
similar goals and policies to render themselves secure. According to Wilkin this common 
pursuit can best be described as "a military defence framework that serves to act as a 
minimum deterrent to external aggressors who might threaten the sovereignty of the state, 
embodied in its territory, boundaries, political institutions, and the general population's 
right to self determination."72 The notion that international politiCS is a separate realm of 
analysis and activity from that of the domestic is a key factor entrenched in the orthodox 
approach; "the international is the realm of survival whereas the domestic is the realm of 
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the good Iife.,,73 The attainment of the latter is dependent upon the ability of the state to 
render itself secure in the former. 
According to Wilkin, the emergence of the human security discourse can be premised upon 
three theoretical criticisms of the orthodox approach to security. The first of these 
criticisms refers to the manner in which the orthodox theoretical framework remains based 
upon an abstract and ahistorical framework. 74 As such, the international system, its 
constituent units, its characteristics and interests are portrayed regardless of time and space. 
Rationality, anarchy, power, and the state centric nature of the global system are "universal 
characteristics in a world of timeless essence" preventing any theoretical account of 
substantive changes. 75 The primary issue remains the fervent sense of essentialism 
embedded within the theory. This leads to a degree of reductionism and determinism which 
has been strongly criticized. While a number of scholars both within and outside the 
orthodox school have attempted to make the theory more amenable to these substantive 
changes, the criticism of the orthodox process of abstraction remains a robust critique. A 
second critique of the orthodox approach has been the lack of theorizing of the state. The 
notion of the functional equivalence of states ignores: the various typologies that reflect the 
varying tasks of states, the relationship between the way various states have come into 
existence within the international system, the relationship between their internal 
constituents and external actors, and, the variance of these dynamics over time.76 Thirdly, 
the assumption of the neutrality of states within the orthodox account of security remains 
strongly reproached. This assumption places states in a neutral space between domestic 
and international relations; rationally pursuing the national interest within the international 
self-help system.77 Both the second and third critique mentioned above remain particularly 
relevant for the analysis of security concerns within Africa and the Third World in general. 
A key argument proposed for the alterations to the security discourse is that notions of 
security must be "embedded within the global capitalist economy and associated global 
social structures.,,78 Richard Ullman's Redefining Security written in 1983 remains a poignant 
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scholarly endeavour in the debate between varying conceptions of "security" and the 
analytical problems that are intrinsic to both. Ullman foresaw the inherent tension between 
the two debates. Firstly, defining national security "merely in military terms conveys a 
profoundly false image of reality." Not only does it precipitate states to focus "on military 
threats and ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers," but, it also contributes 
the "pervasive militarization of international relations that in the long run can only increase 
global insecurity." The corollary is that the incorporation of non-military threats is fraught 
with conceptual peril. Intellectually, it is particularly difficult "to measure the relative 
contributions toward national security.,,79 
In redefining "threats", Ullman delineates some of the tradeoffs that are endemic to this 
analytical endeavour. Subsequently, the notion of a security itself remains a contentious 
and analytically perplexing concept. David Baldwin has argued that debates over varying 
conceptions of security require a clear definition of the notion of security. Baldwin utilizes 
Arnold Wolfers' "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol characterization of security as 
"the absence of threats to acquired values." Since there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the 
phrase "absence of threats," Wolfers further reformulates his definition as a "low 
probability to acquired values." so Wolfers' work focuses on the manner in which the notion 
of "security" in its breadth, cove res such a range of goals that "that highly divergent policies 
can be interpreted as policies of security."s1 Utilizing the work of Walter Lippmann, Wolfers' 
conceptualizes security as a value. According to Wolfers, security has much in common with 
wealth and power, "but while wealth measures the amount of a nation's material 
possession, and power its ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective 
sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the 
absence of fears that such values will be attacked."s2 
For Baldwin, literature pertaining to new security concepts as an aid to coping with the post-
Cold War world can still be accommodated by the conceptual framework as elucidated by 
Wolfers in 1952.S3 Despite the fact that Wolfers focused primarily on the national dimension 
79 Ullman, R. 1983. "Redefining Security", International Security, 8(1), pp. 129 
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of security, he nonetheless acknowledged that security could be discussed on "higher 
and/or lower dimensions as well.,,84 
However, a number of vital questions must be addressed if the multidimensionality of this 
new security approach is to be analytically and prescriptively useful. Herein lies the primary 
critique of the human security approach. While specifying security for whom and for which 
values are fundamental dimensions of the concept of security, IIthey provide little guidance 
for its pursuit.,,8s Additional dimensions also relate to: how much security, from what 
threats, at what costs, by what means, and in what time period?86 
These questions have led to a myriad of critiques within its conceptual, methodological, and 
institutional realms of human security. At a conceptual level, the notion of human security 
remains particularly elusive and less parsimonious, despite its ability to incorporate social 
threats. The literature which offers a critical evaluation of the conceptual framework of 
human security is quick to cite its numerous theoretical flaws. Firstly, the concept of human 
security requires a degree of vexing value judgements required in the conceptualization of 
human security; and its respective core values. Secondly, it requires operationalisation, 
where, as of yet there is no clear consensus within the evolving critical security studies as to 
what constitutes the key parameters of the field of inquiry. For scholars of alternative 
schools of security studies the definition of the field in this manner threatens its intellectual 
coherence and feasibility. As such, the pervasive nature of the concept of human security, 
although frequently cited as a strength, remains its primary flaw. These dimensions have 
entailed that the process of extending the description of security studies is one of "dizzying 
complexity.,,87 The inability to prioritize goals requires that all elements within the holistic 
term are equally valid.88 However, due to the manner in which the multiple elements which 
comprise human security are intrinsically connected and impinge upon one another, and the 
wider socio-economic and political environment, consensus regarding the exact impact of 
various policy surrounding human security becomes exceedingly convoluted. According to 
Roland Paris, it is this broad truism that renders the concept of human security and 
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anachronism for policymakers and academic analysis.89 In addition, the dilemma is further 
compounded by the fact that it is difficult "to talk about certain socioeconomic factors 
'causing' an increase or decline in human security, given these factors are themselves part 
of the definition of human security.,,9o The manner in which international agencies equate 
human security with development is indeed a false depiction. While development is the 
creation of choices, human security is the ability in exercising specific choices. Nonetheless, 
authors such as Paris perceive the human security concept as the sprawling "psychedelic 
umbrella" under which multiple proponents of development are able to gather.91 
2.5 Conclusion 
In light of the above it seems apparent that there is equal contestation about varying 
conceptions of security. As a theoretical tool, human security lacks the parsimonious nature 
that would allow for its acceptance as an academic tool. Nonetheless, this remains part of a 
trade-off which seems endemic to any contemporary understanding of threats which 
operate outside the purely state-centric arena. It must be conceded that the concept of 
human security is not the solution to all of society's ills. However, as an academic approach 
it must also be given credence for its ability to account for a broader notion of threat, 
threats which have become more pervasive and endemic to the concurrent international 
system. 
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Chapter 3: Structural Violence, Human Security and a Materialist Account of Insecurity 
The critique of the human security nonetheless raises the central question of whether the 
paradigm does little more than to just complicate matters, "to no productive purpose?,,92 
Central to the current debate is the manner in which the 1994 Human Development Report 
forwarded the paradigm of human security as a paradigm for addressing the structural 
inequalities which engender insecurity. This is despite the fact that a causal explanation 
thereof was all but absent. For much scholarly endeavour pertaining to the academic 
usefulness of the human security paradigm, credence is given to the manner in which the 
advent of human security marked the emergence of a paradigm which placed the 
dynamics of abject poverty and powerlessness in qualitative congruency with the 
vulnerability to and from threats of physical violence.93 As such, the paradigm of human 
security is given appraisal for the manner in which it implicitly incorporates a broadened 
sense of threat, and the manner in which these threats are congruent with "structural 
violence" that is embedded within the global political, social, and economic systems.94 
Despite alluding to the pertinence of structural violence within much of the literature 
pertaining to human security, little attention is given to the extrapolation of the concept 
and the manner in which its conceptual tenets aid in buttressing some of the paradigmatic 
strengths of human security. 
3.1 Structural Violence 
The notion of structural violence was propagated by Johan Galtung in Violence, Peace, and 
Peace Research in 1969 and remains one of the most influential causal explanations of 
human security.95 Concerning notions and a definition of peace, Galtung highlights the 
incongruency of a conceptualization of peace based upon the absence of physical or somatic 
violence. Similar to the central impetus of the human security endeavour, Galtung discusses 
the manner in which threats, conceptualised in terms of violence, transcend the 
rudimentary "goal orientated" behaviour intended to "achieve some particular or general 
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purpose(s}.,,96 For the purposes of the argument posited, it is necessary to delineate the six 
dimensions of violence according to Galtung. Violence according to Galtung is defined as the 
"cause of the difference between the actual and the potential.,,97 However, this is not 
limited to merely somatic forms of incapacitation at the hands of an actor. An extended 
concept of violence is indispensible; since "highly unacceptable orders would still be 
compatible with peace" according to a narrow somatic definition of violence.98 The actual 
must be deemed "avoidable" for violence to be present. As Galtung notes, the difficulty lies 
in consensus regarding the meaning of "potential realizations." Similar to the traditional 
approach towards security studies, somatic aspects of human life is where "consensus is 
more readily obtained.,,99 For Galtung, this problem remains contentious. In many regards it 
is this problem which leaves the human security endeavour at a point of impasses with 
regards to both its operationalisation and conceptualization. Nonetheless, it does not 
render the paradigm useless in terms of its intellectual resilience in incorporating a broader 
understanding of violence and insecurity. 
3.1.1 Human Insecurity as Structural Violence 
Violence must be understood in terms of influence. The cyclical notion of violence 
presupposes "an influencer, an influencee, and a mode of influence."loo The concept of 
influence remains central in any effort to analyse violence. The first readily acceptable 
distinction to be made by Galtung is that violence can be psychological, physical, or both. 
The subsequent distinctions have specific pertinence to the human and food security 
paradigms. The second distinction concerns the positive and negative approaches towards 
influence. A person can be influenced by punishment according to what the influencer 
considers wrong as well as rewarding him when he does what the influencer considers right. 
In such cases "constraints may be decreased instead of increased, and somatic capabilities 
extended instead of reduced."lOl Violence may still be present in such cases because the net 
result may still be that "people are effectively prevented from realizing their potentialities." 
Accordingly, contemporary thinkers emphasise this point with regards to the manner in 
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which capitalist society "rewards amply he who goes in for consumption, while positively 
punishing he who does not. The system is reward orientated, based on promise of euphoria, 
but in so doing narrows down the ranges of action.,,102 While there remains significant 
contestation around the merits of such a system, "better in terms of giving pleasure rather 
than pain, worse in terms of being more manipulatory, less overt", the important point is 
that the extended concept of violence renders itself a conceptual tool for a much "richer 
basis for discussion.,,103 
The third dimension notes that violence can still be present even in the absence of physical 
and biological hurt. Truncated violence exists when there is the threat of violence and 
indirect threat of mental violence. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, Galtung 
proposes that violence can exist whether or not there is a subject who acts in an intentional 
manner. While violence can be explicit, direct and personal, it can also manifest itself 
inconspicuously in the form of structural or indirect violence.104 In both cases individuals can 
be hurt and manipulated, but the influence remains more implicit within the latter form. 
Structural violence is built into the structure "and shows up as unequal power and 
consequently as unequal life chances."lOS The process remains embedded within the 
distribution of resources and the power to decide over the distribution of these resources. 
The influence is aggravated ifthe influencees who are low on income "are low on education, 
low on health, and low on power- as is frequently the case because these dimensions tend 
to be heavily correlated due to the way they are tied together in the social structure.,,106 At 
this point the materialist criticism can be posited - that capitalist society engenders this 
process since money remains highly convertible and "power to decide over the means of 
the production process is reserved for the owners of the means of production."lo7 This point 
will be explored further within the subsequent sections. Nonetheless, for Galtung the point 
is that "if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, 
regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation ... as in the way world 
economic relations are ordered today.,,108 The fifth distinction made is between violence 
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which is intended and unintended. In both Judeo-Christian and Roman jurisprudence, guilt 
has been tied more heavily to intention rather than consequence.109 The consequence of 
this bias in thinking about violence, peace and related concepts is that ethical systems 
geared against intended consequences will fail to acknowledge forms of structural violence 
which may be both more pervasive and injurious.110 The sixth dimension of violence relates 
to the distinction between manifest and latent forms of violence. Manifest violence, 
whether in the form of direct-personal or indirect structural violence is observable; albeit, 
this may remain contestable due to the notion of "potential realizations." Latent violence is 
defined as violence which is "not there yet Lbut] might easily come about."ll1 The precursor 
to such forms of violence according to Galtung is premised upon situations of unstable 
equilibriums such that the actual realization level easily decreases. 
For Pettman, human security in neo-Marxist terms is a mixed materialist and mentalist 
discourse. The latter of these two dynamics entails the manner in which the crafting of a 
global consciousness is often to the self-serving advancement of the global bourgeoisie; the 
perception of the discourse of human security in its operational sense as a "bourgeois 
smokescreen.,,112 Similarly Taylor, drawing on the work of Mark Neocleous, discusses the 
manner in which the concept of security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society, the 
tension between "security, rationality and development, a capitalist world order.,,113 The 
materialist dynamic refers to the manner in which the neo-Marxists discourse can serve as 
an analytical tool to highlight the exploitation and alienation of global capitalist relations. In 
this manner neo-Marxism can serve as a means of developing an analytical understanding of 
the causes of human insecurity via a "global awareness about the international division of 
labour, the hierarchy of production and control that it represents, and the need to confound 
the hegemonic patterns of behaviour that make these patterns of behaviour possible.,,114 
While several dimensions of Galtung's definition of violence can be related to the paradigm 
of human security, it is the notion of structural violence which deserves significant attention 
for the purposes of a materialist account of human and food insecurity. Most importantly, 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid, pp. 172 
111 Ibid 
112 Pettman, R. 2005. "Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies", pp. 146 
113 Taylor, M. 2009. "Displacing Security in a Divided World: Global Security, International Development, and the Endless 
Accumulation of Capital", Third World Quarterly, 30(1), pp. 149 











the notion of structural violence challenges the traditional bias of thinking about violence as 
personal violence. Whereas "personal violence shows ... Structural violence is silent.,,115 A 
robust understanding about the latter remains embedded within the thinking of the Marxist 
materialist tradition. While the former form of violence shows "tremendous fluctuations 
over time" the latter has shown a certain stability which has aided in its indifference. 
Justification for the distinction between personal and structural violence is presented "(1) in 
terms of a unifying perspective (the cause of the difference between potential and actual 
realization) and (2) by indicating that there is no reason to assume that structural violence 
amounts to less suffering than personal violence."l1G 
Thus, the potential level of realization is that which is possible with a given level 
of insight and resources. If insight and/or resources are monopolized by a group 
or class or are used for other purposes, then the actual falls below the potential 
level, and violence is present in the system. In addition to these types of indirect 
violence there is also direct violence where means of realization are not 
withheld, but directly destroyed ... But there is also indirect violence insofar as 
insight and resources are channelled away from constructive efforts to bring the 
actual closer to the potential.117 
3.2 The Materialist Foundations of Structural Violence 
Rooted in a materialist understanding, the conceptualisation of structural violence is 
extrapolated within Galtung's A Structural Theory of Imperialism. The general formula 
behind structural violence remains inequality, particularly within the distribution of power 
embedded within the interaction structure. Galtung posits that "just as military science and 
related subjects would be indispensable for the understanding of personal violence, so is 
the science of social structure, and particularly stratification, indispensible for the 
understanding of structural violence." 118 The concepts which remain central to the 
understanding of structural violence are that of actor, system, structure, rank and level. The 
conceptualisation is based upon the premise that the world consists of both Centre and 
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Periphery nations, where each nation in turn possesses its own centre and periphery. Centre 
and Periphery nations are defined relatively loosely according to three dimensions. Firstly, 
nations can be categorised according to their absolute properties such as the more readily 
acceptable development variables. Secondly in terms of interaction relations, such as the 
trade composition indices. Thirdly, in terms of the interaction structure, the centrality of the 
nation within the vertical interaction structure.119 
The system of imperialism is seen as an ordering structural relationship which IIsplits up the 
collectives" by engendering relations of harmony of interest in some areas and relations of 
disharmony of interest in others.120 The notion of interest is closely tied to the idea of living 
condition (LC) but also a IIvalue premise of equality".121 Living condition may be measured in 
terms of variables such as income, IIstandard of living in the usual materialistic sense - but 
notions of quality of life would certainly also enter, not to mention notions of autonomy.,,122 
Conflict of interest is defined as a "special case of conflict in general, defined as a situation 
where parties are pursuing incompatible goals.,,123 Conflict, or disharmony of interest, exists 
when nations interact in such a way that the LC gap between them increases. The specific 
concern for Galtung is the manner in which lIinteraction relations and interactions 
structures are arranged in such a manner to induce inequality to the detriment of the 
weaker party.,,124 
Borrowing largely from the work of Lenin, Galtung defines imperialism as the manner in 
which the Centre nation has power over the Periphery nation, such that a condition of 
disharmony of interest exists between the two nations. This relationship remains a product 
of both intra- and inter-national relations. Firstly, there exists a harmony of interest 
between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in the Periphery nation. Secondly, 
there is more disharmony of interest within the periphery nations. Thirdly, there is a 
disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Periphery nation and the periphery in 
the Centre nation.125 While both the Centre and the Periphery are vertical societies, with LC 
gaps, the inequality within the Periphery surpasses that within the Centre. This dynamic 
119 Galtung, J. 1971. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal oj Peace Research, 8(2), pp. 103 
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engenders the two centres, both in the Periphery and the Centre. The centre in the 
Periphery is seen as a "transmission belt" for the transferral of value (e.g. raw materials) to 
the Centre nation.126 Interactions enrich both centres, with some enrichment trickling down 
to the periphery in the centre. However, central to entire structural arrangement is the 
manner in which "there is less disharmony of interest in the Centre than in the Periphery, so 
that the total arrangement is largely in the interest of the periphery in the Centre.,,127 
The mechanisms of this imperialist relationship are two-fold. The first mechanism relates to 
the interaction itself, and the second relates to the symmetry or asymmetry of the 
interaction within the interaction structure. Within the former, the interaction involves both 
vertical interaction relations as well as a feudal interaction structure. The former involves 
the value exchange between the actors, "inter-actor effects", and the effect inside the 
actors, "intra-actor effects.,,128 The latter refers to the feudal interaction structure both 
within and between nations; a divide et imperia which operates in a reinforcing manner 
both at the inter- and intra-national level. Vertical interaction is the major factor behind 
inequality, while the periphery's feudal interaction structure is the dynamic which both 
reinforces and maintains the inequality.129 According to Galtung's model of imperialism, 
global exchange is based upon an international division of labour between Periphery nations 
which supply raw and/or semi-finished products and Centre nations which supply finished 
products. 
Contemporary vertical interaction revolves around the process of exchange according to the 
principle of comparative advantage between two nations. The dynamic engenders structural 
violence primarily due to the manner in which exchange occurs across different levels of 
processing; where processing is defined as the activity of imposing Culture (e.g. 
mathematics, science) on Nature (e.g. raw materials).13o The dynamic is engendered if the 
centre in the Periphery is content on "being rather than becoming, on ownership rather 
than processing.,,131 The centre in the periphery relies upon its periphery to extract raw 
materials. Nature is thus, through the "beneficial interaction", converted into money, 
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however since there was so little effort required on the behalf of the Periphery this is 
precisely what makes the exchange so disadvantageous in the long-run. 
These vertical interactions, inter-actor effects, also have intra-actor effects which are hard 
to conceptualise in their "social totality.,,132 As nations exchange products, with differences 
in processing levels, the intra-actor effects are seen as impinging upon multiple dimensions. 
While there is a bias to see this merely in terms of subsidiary economic effects, the 
dimensions also engender changes for nations' political position in the world structure, 
military benefits, communication benefits, knowledge and research, specialist knowledge, 
skills and education, social structure, and psychological effects.133 Therefore, the nation 
"that in the international division of labour has the task of providing the most refined 
processed products ... will obviously engage in research. Research needs a  infrastructure, a 
wide cultural basis of universities ... and it has obvious spill-over effects in the social, 
political, and military domains.,,134 As such positive spin-offs accrue in relative superfluity to 
nations with higher processing levels, and also further reinforce their position relative to the 
latter. The dynamic is part of the foundation of a "social machinery" which engenders highly 
differentiated and asymmetrical spin-off. The economic consequences can entail a degree of 
import and export concentration, as well as commodity concentration and export 
dependency for the Periphery nation. The ramifications hereof obviously infiltrate beyond 
merely the economic dimension. 
3.3 Conclusion 
While Galtung's conceptualisation of the mUltiple dimensions of intra-actor effects remains 
tentative, the important dynamic with regards to current debate is the manner in which 
"professional imperialism is based on structural rather than direct violence." 135 The 
argument posits a strong case for the conceptualization of the causal dynamics and 
objective consequences of human insecurity in terms of repressive structures; which, in turn, 
lead to highly disparate social structures and the cyclical reinforcement of the structure 
itself. If the focus is on the objective consequences rather than the subjective intentions 
132 Ibid. 
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which inhibit the potential realizations of individuals, then human insecurity must be 












Chapter 4: Food Insecurity as a Manifestation of Structural Violence 
Addressed from a materialism perspective, human security possess a robust paradigmatic 
forte in its ability to account for the emergence of "social threats" which both reinforce and 
manifest through the process of structural violence. Utilizing the theoretical framework of 
Johan Galtung's structural account of imperialism, and the manner in which it engenders 
structural violence, the subsequent section seeks to delineate some of the key conceptual 
tenets of how contemporary food security concerns can be understood in terms of a 
materialist account of structural violence. 
4.1 Overview of Contemporary Food Security Concerns: Biofuels versus Food 
At the outset it is necessary to outline the broad nature of food security concerns as they 
relate to the sub-Saharan African context. In late 2007 global concerns were raised about a 
declining global staple food availability and the possibility of a global food security crisis. 
Mirroring the transitory shortfall phase of the mid-1970's, these concerns occurred in 
conjunction with increased oil prices. These empirical dynamics have foreshadowed global 
land investment acquisitions by private conglomerates and state owned enterprises alike in 
a pre-emptive attempt to attain future food and energy security. Concerns have 
subsequently been raised regarding the possible impact these dynamics may have on poorer 
communities' access to land, entitlement and livelihoods, as poorer farmers are displaced 
from the land in the interests of rewards in new global economic niches in the maize, oil 
seeds and sugarcane sectors. These concerns are frequently framed within the conceptual 
framework of human and food security literature. According to this literature, increased 
pressures are likely to be exacerbated by demographic growth and rising urbanization which 
remain common features of many developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.136 
Sub-Saharan Africa remains especially vulnerable. In Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Tanzania alone, national inventories recorded a staggering 2 492 684 
hectares (ha) of land allocated for agricultural investment between 2004 and the 2009.137 
One of the major motivations behind the growing number of land acquisitions is the issue of 
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food and energy security. The global population is expected to reach nine billion by 2050 
and already, placing high demand on food production.138 In addition, increasing urbanisation 
means that a greater share of the global population is beginning to depend on food 
purchases. Roughly 60 percent of the global demand comes from nations that are 
dependent on imports for their food.139 For these net food-importers (particularly nations 
like the Gulf States, which are oil-rich but, essentially desert), Africa's arable land is 
becoming an increasingly valuable commodity. Though many wealthy nations can easily 
afford to import food, the uncertainty of the global food and energy markets makes land 
acquisitions pivotal for securing food supplies for their own people. In 2008, global cereal 
prices had increased by approximately 60% and in 2006 sugar prices peaked at a level twice 
as high as previous years.140 This occurred because the agriculture sector is increasingly 
linked to the energy sector, both indirectly, via input costs, and directly via competition for 
resources such as water and land for the production of food, feed or energy cropS.141 
Government consumption targets for biofuels142 in the developed world have also been a 
driving force behind foreign agricultural investment as well as increased food prices. 
Volatility in the oil price over the last few years has led nations to pursue alternative energy 
sources for long-term sustainability. Additionally, projections of dwindling supplies of non-
renewable energy sources have led nations to pursue biofuel expansion. Importantly, some 
biofuel feedstocks and bioethanol produce compete for land use with staple foods, thereby 
further increasing land-use demand and, subsequently, the food price.143 Higher energy 
prices are also believed to place added constraints on the inputs of the agricultural sector 
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value chain, driving the prices up for energy intensive inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides 
and fuel. 144 
Foreign land acquisition of land in poorer African states has raised accusations of "neo-
colonial" behaviour. This is particularly pertinent given the long term nature of these land 
leases. Fifty- and even 99-year land leases are likely to be both politically and socially 
unsustainable unless local welfare is guaranteed. Lacking negotiation power, the rural poor 
remain vulnerable to "powerful forces offering comparatively large amounts of windfall 
cash."14S Frequently, where the land is de jure within the ownership of the fiscally 
impecunious states, investors may take precedence. 146 Daewoo Logistics 1,3 million hectare 
abortive acquisition in Madagascar in 2007 was mired in contestation about the 
ramifications the investment would have on smallholder entitlement. In 2008, a Chinese 
businessman secured 10000 hectares o{ land in Cameroon for rice production.147 Later that 
same year, three Gulf firms created an Islamic investment fund, AgriCapital worth $1 billion, 
which purchased land internationally to produce food for the desert region, as well as fund 
research in biotechnology.148 In Mozambique, joint partnerships were being negotiated with 
the Chinese government to develop rice production, while investments were being made in 
infrastructure, research, and training.149 Further specific examples include GEM Biofuels' 50 
year lease of 450000 ha in Madagascar, UK energy firm CAMS Group's 45 000 ha lease in 
Tanzania, Varun Agriculture SARL's lease of 170 000 ha in Mozambique, and US based Jarch 
Capital's land acquisition in southern Sudan.lso 
There remains significant contestation around the supposed long-term adverse effects of 
the "food-versus-fuel" scenario. Food prices have steadily increased since 2002, increasing 
by 140 percent between 2002 and 2008. Approximately 75 percent of this increase is due to 
biofuel production.1Sl According to the UN, biofuel is expected to supply 25 percent of 
global energy between the next 15-20 years. The aggregations hereof predict Third World 
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countries to be the primary suppliers of biofuels while First World countries will be the 
primary consumers.152 The biofuel niche of monoculture production, particularly in jatropha, 
is frequently cited as both an infrastructure and employment stimulating trend. It is argued 
that these spinoffs counteract adverse effects by generating income and expanding 
agricultural production technology via biofuel development in tropical climates which are 
suitable for export-led and rural-based development strategies. It is argued that these 
effects in turn increase the purchasing power of the rural poor and decrease their 
vulnerability to price shocks within the energy and food markets.153 Such trends are a 
marked divergence from the past trends of stagnation or decline that characterised the 
long-term trend in many of these commodity markets. Furthermore, fossil-fuel importing 
nations in the developing world may be offered the chance to reduce their energy 
expenditures. For example, Tanzania currently spends 25 percent of its foreign exchange 
earnings on importing oil.154 The emergence of the Pan-African Non-Petroleum Producers 
Association signifies the increased state acknowledgement hereof. Nonetheless, as Ewing 
and Msangi note, the positive ramifications thereof remain dependent upon whether 
investment is geared towards the satisfaction of smallholders' and labourers' livelihoods 
which remain part of a sizeable value chain.155 
4.1.1 Food Security as the Contradiction of Capitalism for Peasantry Entitlement 
Of pertinence to the current debate is the manner in which market driven forces might 
engender insecurities in line with the aforementioned materialist argument. Specifically, 
how these concerns manifest themselves in terms of "unequal power and consequently as 
unequal life chances."156 The subsequent debate frames the empirical concerns regarding 
the manner in which these impact upon the individual rural poor farmer. This dilemma has 
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been framed within materialist literature as the tensions between "subsistence and market 
participation, of peasant subordination to other social groups."1S7 
Within Marxist and agrarian political economy literature, the contradictions of capitalism as 
they relate to the agricultural sector are frequently framed in the manner in which they 
impact upon the peasantry's livelihood. According to Bryceson the term "peasantry" refers 
to rural dwellers who "occupationally live off the land as farmers and/or pastoralists 
combining subsistence and commodity production."lS8 By defining peasants as farmers the 
implication is that their access to the resource of land remains crucial for the attainment of 
their livelihood.1s9 They occupy lithe margins of the modern world economy. With one foot 
in the market and the other in subsistence they are neither fully integrated into that 
economy nor wholly insulated from its pressures."l60 The following discussion draws 
attention to peasant vulnerability, a term which has in part emerged from the populist 
tradition of "taking the part of the peasant." According to Ellis this can be expressed in 
terms of exposure, the risk factor, and sensitivity, the precariousness of the peasant to 
livelihood shocks. 161 The pertinence of the Marxian conceptual framework in is that it 
places emphasis on the social reproductive nature of the peasantry's productive activity, 
and on the contradictions of market participation. As such it draws attention to the manner 
in which the process of commodification engenders high vulnerability via a process of 
agrarian change and primitive accumulation. 
4.2 The Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of the Peasantry 
The conceptual framework for the analysis of peasant vulnerability and its relationship to 
capitalism- the agrarian question- is particularly vast. However, little credence has given to 
the manner in which contemporary food insecurity is related to the process by which 
African smallholder agriculture is exposed to the indirect forms of structural violence which 
are embedded within the contemporary capitalist international system. Teodor Shanin 
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notes that lIany image of the peasant household or peasant community with no 'external' 
ties are conceptual constructs, exceptions, miscomprehensions or caricature ... The massive 
extension in the intensity of ties during the last decade made them more central than ever 
effort at the understanding of the peasantry.,,162 According to Frank Ellis, Marxian political 
economy stresses the manner in which livelihood of all groups of people is dependent upon 
two dynamics. Firstly, who holds effective control over the productive resources and, 
secondly, what occurs to the output created from those resources.163 Such productive 
resources, which include land and other instruments of production, are referred to as the 
means of production. Output thereof may be directly consumed or sold. The social relations 
of production refer to the direct relationship between control of these resources and use of 
the output thereof.164 The social relations of production remain inextricably linked to class 
differentiation which is manifested through the evolution of capitalism. Hence, the social 
relations of production determine not only the access individuals have to productive 
resources but also their entitlement to the product thereof. An extension of this notion is 
that of the mode of production, which characterises social and economic systems of 
dominance as a whole. This includes the forces of production and the superstructure which 
regulates the operation.165 
Labour in Marxian political economy is seen as distinct from other inputs of production, and 
is central for the materialist account of food security, as it draws attention to the individual 
both within, and outside the production structure; the peasant. Labour is central to the 
process of social reproduction, or lithe material [in]capacity for social renewal.,,166 Social 
reproduction can be simple reproduction, maintaining the same material level of living, or 
expansive.167 The latter of these two forms requires expanded output, or value, in the form 
of investment, and more importantly surplus value; surplus above wage costs of production. 
Ellis notes the creation of surplus does not necessarily guarantee expanded social 
reproduction because of the manner by which local and global class structures can inhibit 
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such alterations. Since capitalism is based on a social class structure to achieve a level of 
surplus, the social relations of production are already embedded within the system.16B 
Just as class is central to the social relations of production, so too is it that class remains 
central to the dynamics of human security; because "inequalities of social power and class 
manifest in the myriad forms of exploitation, subordination, and unequal access to 
resources that help generate conflict within and between states and societies.//169 This 
dynamic reflects itself in a structural positioning and lived experience of the individual, since 
the material positioning of various classes is "directly related to their social power and the 
subsequent uneven satisfaction of their human needs.// 17o Marxian agrarian political 
economy argues that commodification plays a central role in engendering this class 
differentiation. According to Marx, primitive accumulation demands that "once capital 
exists, the capitalist mode of production itself evolves in such a way that maintains and 
reproducers this separation [between producers and the means of production] on a 
constantly increasing scale ... ,// meaning that accumulation is premised on the "silent 
compulsion of economic relations.//171 The process of primitive accumulation is inherently 
exploitative in nature, requiring the "appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural 
and social achievements as well as confrontation and suppression.//172 
Marxian agrarian theoretical work makes a strong distinction between the manner in which 
this process is engendered within feudal and subsequent capitalist social relations. Under 
the former peasants are a class whose subordinate role is necessary for the renewal of 
feudal social relations. 173 Under the latter Marxian theoretical work is marked by 
contestation. Literature pertaining to the agrarian question under capitalism is separated 
into two distinct categories. Farshad Araghi labels these two bodies of literature the 
permanence thesis and the disappearance thesis. 174 The literature concerning the 
disappearance thesis argues for capitalism as the force of social differentiation, the process 
whereby peasant communities are predicted to dissolve into two social classes of wage 
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labourers and capitalist farmers.175 The disappearance thesis, as advocated by Marx and 
Engels, argued that the dissolution of the peasantry was a logical and inevitable 
consequence of class differentiation in rural areas of European nations. Marx initially 
forwarded the notion of "primitive accumulation." Primitive accumulation refers to the 
process whereby peasantry would inevitably be transformed into a proletariat stripped of 
control over the mean of production and divorced from their land.176 According to Engels 
the peasant is "hopelessly doomed ... a future proletarian."l77 Karl Kautsky's The Agrarian 
Question and Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia further elucidated the 
disappearance thesis. Kautsky's interpretation of the disappearance thesis was to see it as a 
"tendency subject to countervailing influences."l78 In contrast, Lenin sought to show how 
the dissolution of Russia's peasantry had involved the emergence of "a class of commodity 
producers in agriculture and a class of agriculture wage workers."l79 
In variation to the disappearance thesis the permanence thesis argues that peasant societies 
persist because "they operate according to a logic that enables them to resist the 
expansionary forces of capitalism."l8o The genealogy of the permanence thesis is commonly 
recognised as having its origins in the work of Russian economist A. V. Chayanov's The 
Theory of the Peasant Economy. Herein Chayanov extrapolated from Marx's modes of 
production what may be cited as "the peasant mode of production." As an economic system 
in its own right the aim was to demonstrate the manner in which peasant production was 
geared towards "the satisfaction of family needs to the point that their subjective distaste 
for manual labour outweighs the possible increase in output." l8l 
There are multiple components which underpin the permanence thesis and the belief that 
peasants can withstand the pressures of agrarian capitalism. Ellis notes that, firstly, peasant 
economies are geared towards reciprocity rather than profit maximization. Secondly is the 
subdivision of land based on inheritance. Thirdly, the capacity of the peasant to withstand 
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market forces by "self-exploitation.,,182 Fourthly, the natural and technical nature of peasant 
farming which makes it unattractive to capital. Fifthly, the manner in which capitalism can 
reduce risk and costs by leaving peasant production to operate towards its functional 
advantage and finally, the ability of peasants to maintain their needs of simple production 
"due to their control over the means of production, especially land.,,183 Orthodox Marxian 
approaches also concede that there are two other dynamics which are working against the 
dissolution of peasant production. Firstly is the argument that simple reproduction of the 
peasant is in the interest of capitalism. This is facilitated through the process of surplus 
appropriation via rents of various kinds, price hikes and taxes. This helps in the 
"devalorisation" of peasant labour time in the interests of capitalism.184 
Numerous attempts have been made to apply the late-nineteenth century debate on the 
peasant question to the Third World. Central to the current debate is the manner in which 
agrarian change is related to food insecurity, and how this process must be understood in 
the context of structural violence and the imperialist mechanisms which engender it. The 
subsequent debate errs in favour of Kautsky's argument that the disappearance thesis 
remains a process which is subject to countervailing tendencies. Within sub-Saharan Africa, 
the marginal persistence of the peasantry may be regarded as what Alain de Janvry calls 
"functional dualism", the persistence of the peasantry to fuel the capitalist enterprise via 
cheap labour for surplus-value.18s Despite the fact that the concept of functional dualism 
was developed by de Janvry in his analysis of the agrarian question in Latin America, the 
nature of functional dualism still holds strong impetus within sub-Saharan Africa where 
"imperialism ... preserves this backward form of production.,,186 
4.3 The African Peasantry 
An application of the agrarian question to the Third World is fraught with conceptual peril as 
the agrarian question was based upon the renderings of nineteenth century Europe. The 
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historical conditions and contemporary manifestations of the agrarian question in sub-
Saharan Africa requires a unique conceptualization of the African peasantry. 
The definition of the peasantry provided above remains an ahistorical conceptualisation and 
possesses a descriptive utility. Henry Bernstein's theoretical framework for the analysis of 
contemporary peasantries, with specific reference to Africa and Tanzania in particular is apt 
for the current discussion. The key difference between African peasantries and their 
European counterparts lies is the difference between feudal forms of surplus labour 
appropriation, and "relations of commodity production and exchange which lock them into 
the international capitalist economy/' respectively.187 The latter centres upon a specific 
social relation of production which is of applicable value to the current debate. 
Understanding this dynamic requires an acknowledgement of the theory of "the capitalist 
mode of production using that theory to understand the 'world-historical' process (Marx) of 
the development of capitalism on a global scale, to investigate how pre-capitalist modes of 
production are destroyed in the process and pre-capitalist forms of production (such as 
peasant production) subsumed in the circuit of capital.,,188 In line with Bernstein's argument, 
this process can be chronologically represented in the form of: the destruction of the 
natural economy, the process of commodification, the simple reproductive squeeze, the 
differentiation of the peasantry, and finally, the extent of commoditisation.189 While there 
are indeed some extending widespread characteristics, the plural, peasantries, is used to 
indicate that the trend for the peasantries of Africa has been for from ubiquitous: primarily 
due to some of the contradictory and uneven development of capitalism on the 
continent.19o 
Social relations prior to the penetration of capital define the natural economy. Although 
exchange relations did exist, the production of "use-value" is perceived as dominant.191 
Occurring during the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the destruction of the natural 
economy was facilitated primarily through the colonial state, although this process is argued 
to have been underway since the sixteenth century through 'private accumulation' in the 
form of slave trade and the amassing of natural products. According to Bernstein, the 
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colonial state required the explicit exploitation of labour, "which necessitated breaking the 
reproduction cycle of the natural economy."192 The repercussions hereof resulted in the 
initial removal of use-value production in agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting, and fishing. 
Furthermore, monetisation forced the first movement of rural producers towards 
commodity production, either in the form of wage labour or cash cropS.193In a dialectic 
fashion, the destruction of the natural economy facilitates the creation of conditions of 
commodity production. The means thereof included the imposition of taxes, the use of 
forced labour in public works, the creation of plantations by settlers, international capital, 
and/or the state, and the inevitable imposition of cash crop production.194 The slow demise 
of use-value production necessitates the consumption and production of commodities to 
meet the needs of simple reproduction in the face of pressures exerted by the process of 
commoditization. In this manner the peasant can be said to be a simple commodity 
producer. 
Commoditization has not occurred evenly across sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture within the 
sub-Saharan African setting consists primarily of smallholder units. According to Bryceson, 
this consists of a large percentage of "nonmarket, self-provisioning activities, labelled the 
subsistence sector, whose nature and extent are difficult to measure objectively."195 
Nonetheless, as commodification occurs, simple commodity production becomes essential 
for social reproduction. Simple commodity producers thus engage in subsistence (use-value) 
production, for the non-productive members of the household, as well as generating a 
replacement fund through the sale of a commodity.196 The simple commodity producer is 
not a proletariat since there remains some control over the organization of production, as 
well as no internal division of labour to the production process.197 The central difficulty 
remains the balance between use-value production and commodity production. The 
productive resources of land, labour and time are all central to this process. 
The destruction of the natural economy and the process of commodification highlights the 
initial and long-term process of structural violence which merchant capital sets upon the 
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peasantry. Merchant capitalism according to Bernstein is lithe form of capital which 
organises the circulation of commodities." This is done in an indirect manner and can only 
be undertaken via lIunequal exchange, that is, by buying commodities and selling them at, 
or above, their value." 198 During the colonial era the interest was in maintaining the supply 
and production of cash crops. These interests were embodied within the interests of the 
metropolitan consumers; large trading companies; and the colonial state- which required 
commodification to lIincrease its revenue from taxation (to meet the costs of administration 
and of infrastructure development, and to contribute to imperial investment funds 
accumulated in the capital of the colonial powerL to ensure the supply of raw materials to 
the industries of the home country, and at the ideological level to turn Africans into 
'economic men.1II199 This was conducted in conjunction with the monopolistic pricing 
arrangements of marketing boards as well as IIcu ltivation bye-laws, compulsory land-
improvement schemes and credit and extension schemes which tied producers more closely 
to particular kinds of production.,,2oo Imperialist motives of the colonial era served to define 
colonial land policies which continued to undermine individual peasantry livelihood well into 
the post-colonial era.201 
During this period peasants slowly began to experience a IIreproduction squeeze" as they 
were exposed to increasing cost of production as well as decreasing returns from labour. It 
also important to note that peasants emerge as a subordinate class, subsidiary to the state's, 
regional, and international market's agenda of extracting surplus and engendering further 
class differentiation.202 According to Moyo, the role of the African peasantry as producers in 
relation to the international and state markets is central to understanding their repression 
and exploitation.203 Increased competition and increased costs of lIefficient production 
demands the use of more expensive means of production.204 This extensive use of fertilizers, 
insecticides, pesticides, and intensified cultivation leads to the inhibition of fallow patterns 
and increases the precariousness of future output based on soil quality. By definition the 
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IIlow level of development of the productive forces of peasant agriculture means that the 
household is extremely vulnerable to failure in any of its material elements of 
production.,,20s Deteriorating terms of exchange further exacerbate this vulnerability. This 
process leads to a dynamic whereby the acquisition of a cash income becomes an 
imperative for simple reproduction, replacing use-value production.206 
According to Bernstein, this has an important impact upon food production since: 
... when food needs are satisfied on a regular basis by the purchase of food this 
signifies the that commodity relations have developed to a higher level. It 
reflects a more advanced social division of labour in which some peasants 
specialise in the commercial production of food, some of which is directed 
through the market to peasants engaged in other branches of production, or in 
which food is produce on capitalist farms with higher levels of productivity of 
labour and is available more cheaply food produced within the household.207 
Nonetheless, Bernstein argues that in Africa the differentiation of the peasantry prevents a 
ubiquitous application of an advanced social division of labour. The distinction is made 
between poor, middle and rich peasants. Household use-value production can not sustain 
reproduction of the poor peasant. These peasantries thus emerge as rural semi-proletariats 
but retain access to a small plot of land which enables a degree of subsistence, albeit this 
also reduces their labour value. Middle peasantries can reproduce themselves but only via 
IItheir relationship with other forms of production." 208 This is often via a precarious 
relationship with the IIkulaks" or rich peasantries, who act as an all round lIagent for the 
extension of commodity relations" and have managed to accumulate a sufficient amount for 
purchasing superior means of production. Similar to the work of Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin, 
the resultant commodification adversely effects the poor, and sometime middle, 
peasantries who, have to reduce their standard of consumption as well as produce 
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commodities in concurrence with reduced terms of exchange; the result is the squeeze or 
devalorisation of peasant labour time in the interests of capitalist forms of production.
20g 
Following independence, the role of the African state is also noteworthy in the manner in 
which it has facilitated the extent of commodification. The state remains a key player in 
vertical concentration, "the coordination, standardisation and supervision" of small 
producers.2lO Firstly, the role of the state is economic in the sense that the ruling classes 
have an interest in accumulation. Their reproduction is dependent upon their accumulation 
of state or individual property and alliances with international capital. Commodification is 
central in this process, often to the point that the state's ruling classes may have more of a 
"direct interest in the development of commodity relations within any given country than 
international companies which mobilise capital and switch investment on a global basis.,,211 
4.4 Depeasantisation and Deagrarianisation in sub-Saharan Africa 
The process of commoditisation is attributable to two trajectories within peasant 
production. The first is the notion of deagrarianisation. According to Bryceson, the process 
involves: (1) occupational readjustment, (2) the reorientation of livelihood, and (3) the 
spatial realignment of human settlement away from agrarian areas.212 The second trajectory 
relates to the notion of depeasantisation, which is the "the erosion of the family basis of 
livelihood," a dynamic which inhibits the social cohesion of the peasantry?13 The literature 
which focuses on deagrarianisation and livelihood diversification is split between scholars 
who conceptualise it as a matter of opportunity and choice, versus those who see the 
process as a survival response which is subject to greater degrees of risk or vulnerability.214 
The divergence between literature which is critical versus supportive of deagrarianisation 
has much to do with the categorisation of the peasantry. According to Seppala, wealthy 
households (kuleks) can utilise such options to generate higher profits, middle-income 
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households (middle peasantry) make use of diversification for risk minimisation, while poor 
households (poor peasants) are forced to utilise such options as a survival strategy.21S 
The purpose of the current debate is not so much as to discuss the empirical data validating 
this process, but rather discuss this tendency in broad terms and draw correspondence to 
the manner in which it resembles a form of structural violence which results in the 
difference between the actual and the potential. 
Recent biofuel acquisitions have been labelled as a new form of imperialist plunder, but 
little attention has been given to the manner in which the process forms part of a continued 
trend in the agrarian rivalry between peasant production and commodification.216 Farshad 
Araghi's global and historical-materialist conceptualisation of this process highlights the 
interplay of social, economic, political and ideological forces at the domestic and global level. 
Araghi has shown that this process of deruralization has occurred relatively ubiquitously 
across the developing world, with sub-Saharan Africa experiencing approximately a 12 
percent rate of deruralisation between 1960 and 1980, despite a non-unilinear variance 
between states.217 This process occurred slowly during the post-war economic nationalism 
era, but has become "relatively" more pervasive post-1973. Prior to the failings of national 
developmentalist strategies, national protection strategies afforded peasant agriculture a 
range of benefits via subsidised inputs which "slowed down the rate at which naked 
exposure to market forces would have undermined the position of millions of small farm 
owners."218 This support was essential for peasants to meet their livelihood needs. The 
United State's interest of disposing domestic subsidised grains surpluses, as well as utilising 
food aid as a political leverage, contributed the initial deagrarianisation process between 
1945 and 1973.219 As part ofthe New Deal, which sought to protect American farmers, over 
subsidised U.S grain prices contributed to the depression of world prices, discouraged its 
production in previously self-sufficient regions, and internationalised the American diet; 
resulting in the progressive replacement and increased reliance on food imports.22o Post-
independent African states, with relatively low levels of food productivity and high domestic 
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transport costs became heavily reliant upon cheap U.S. and European Community staple 
food supplies; the initial perpetuation of food import dependency. In this sense food 
security was achieved at the expense of domestic staple food production, 
counterproductive social divisions of labour, and the further marginalisation of peasant 
production. 221 Sub-Saharan Africa also experience "derived urbanisation." Given the 
favourable political and economic conditions, urbanisation remained dependent upon the 
nationalisation of state power and the internationalisation of capital. As a consequence, a 
dual economy was established whereby peasants supplied the cheap labour and raw 
materials which iii built' the urban areas, ... But the circuit did not return to the rural 
areas.,,222 
The disappearance thesis has held more strongly post-1973. The contributing facts thereof 
are attributable to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and the emergence of 
finance capital that can more freely evade national regulation. Structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP's) concurrent with 1980's lending policies and outward-orientated 
economic growth strategies espoused by the International Monetary Fund (lMF), World 
Bank, and other bilateral donors, further set commoditisation upon the peasantry. U.S 
hegemony and the theoretical preoccupation with efficient market allocation has 
necessitated the deregulation of the land market, the devaluation of African currencies, and 
the removal of subsidies. 223 This occurred in conjunction with deterioration global 
agricultural commodity prices in the 1980's and 1990's and continued urbanization. 
Akram-Lodhi has labelled this era of neoliberal reform the reconfiguration of a "bifurcated" 
agrarian property relations in the South; the emergence of export-orientated capitalist 
farming alongside peasant subsistence-orientated farming.224 This reconfiguration bears 
strong similarity with de Janvry's notion of functional dualism. The process was heavily 
premised on the market-led agrarian reform (MLAR) processes pursued in African states. 
The process was premised on the assumption that land was "principally an economic 
resources; and that markets are institutions in which participants are equal.,,225 MLAR 
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sought to instigate the replacement of state owned land with willing seller-willing buyer 
agrarian reforms in which market facilitated transactions were believed to generate 
economic efficiency and welfare. These policies also fell within the confines of a general 
regime impetus towards liberalised trade in agricultural products, privatization, 
deregulation, and defined property relations.226 Such policies legitimised the expansion of 
large scale farming and landholdings and undermined the redistributive land reform policies 
in favour of the peasantry.227 However, these assumptions ignore the socially embedded 
nature of land and markets as discussed above, whereby land possesses not only a 
livelihood element for the peasantry but also a set of social, economic, ecologicat political, 
and cultural dynamics. The nature of capitalist agrarian reform inevitably undermined these 
embedded social relations, "transforming the socially embedded nature of land into that of 
a more abstract, and hence alienated, commodity.,,228 The subtraction of these relations 
resembles what is referred to as depeasantisation, a specific form of deagrarianisation 
whereby peasants are detrimentally affected, loosing their economic capacity and social 
coherence.229 
According to Bryceson, the period from 1980 to 1995 resulted in the increased intensity of 
deagrarianisation and depeasantisation whereby "peasant agriculture, with its subsistence 
orientation, and relatively low yielding, unstandardised agriculture ... was the antithesis of 
agro-industrial production in the world's agricultural commodity trade circuits ... reflected in 
the steady decline of African agricultural exports as a share of the world's agricultural trade 
as well as two dramatic surges of imports, notably food, into the continent." 230 The second 
critique of MLAR is that its neoclassical conceptualisation ignores the manner in which 
"market transactions are built upon non-market institutions which structure resource 
control and allocation. Thus markets, like land, are embedded within the wider social 
processes and relations.,,231 This argument relates to Bernstein's assertion that since 
dominant classes own significant share of the means of production they can de facto 
"regulate" market relations to the detriment of those who enter the market with limited 
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means of production; even under the 'ideal type" economic and governance structures 
which might attempt to mitigate these dynamics.232 
The effects of MLAR and commodification on the peasantry thus engenders the concept and 
telos of enclosure in shaping rural Iivelihoods.233 Furthermore, enclosure and the extension 
of commodification also result in IIInegative externalities", that is costs that are not included 
in the market price of goods because these costs are incurred by social agents who are 
external to the producing firm.,,234 The result of neoliberal enclosure has thus been the 
significant reduction of the relative power of peasants, achieved by direct policies that 
promote capitalist economic rationality, which despite contextual variation, have resulted in 
diminished access to land and Iivelihood.235 
As commodity relations penetrated these countries more heavily, land reform, the 
industrialization of agriculture, and state support thereof in line with primary export 
development strategies, accelerated the process of deagrarianisation. This resulted in an 
increased diversification of sources of income and livelihood; "dependence partly on petty 
commodity production, partly on rural labour markets, partly on seasonal migration as well 
as occasional wage labour on large capitalised farms during peak periods, an, more recently, 
on subcontracting income linked to multinational corporations.,,236 
As a response to increased risks of private accumulation the "knee-jerk reaction" was to 
"secure access to land for direct food provisioning." Bryceson states that household budget 
surveys in sub-Saharan Africa of the 1970's and 1980's indicates that this occurred via urban 
investment into the rural sector at the "hands of the relatively better off ... deepening the 
rural labour market.,,237 This has resulted in the bifurcated agrarian structure which 
characterises much of sub-Saharan Africa. Commodification, and the semi-
proletarianisation of the peasantry, has resulted in the emergence of a globally integrated 
export-orientated sub-sector which is incorporated into the agro-food system but emerges 
at the expense of the produce-for-use sector. According to Akam-Lodhi this is based upon 
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an imperialist relationship whereby the South "acts as a provider of agro-food commodities 
that lower the value of labour power in the North and hence raise the rate of relative 
surplus value, while at the same time having the potential to act as a source of agri-fuels 
that could power capitalist production.,,238 This relationship is direct but also indirect, 
undertaken by dominant classes and intermediaries, both public and private. For Shivji, the 
role of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been particularly influential in facilitating the 
emergence and reproduction of peripheral capitalism in the African state, often concealed 
by the facade of a socialist depiction.239 For McMichael, the continuation of the American 
model of agro-industrialization in the Third World has served to construct a new division of 
labour whereby Southern labour is pivoted on specialising in high-value non-traditional 
exports and low-value cereal imports from the North; fortifying southern food 
dependency.24o As such the agrarian question is framed as a "political construct" which has 
been managed across the north/south divide by capitalist power relations embedded within 
multilateral policies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the IMF.241 
Frank Ellis links this process to increased vulnerability whereby peasants are "everless able 
to generate surpluses of any kind."242 The late liberalisation drive has in many ways been 
unable to overcome the "pathological" market inefficiencies of the parastatal era. For 
peasant production this has resulted in a IIIfood security first' rationale that the upheavals of 
liberalisation merely enforced ... it makes sense for them to retain as much production as 
required [in the face of increased enclosure] to ensure annual food security.,,243 Similarly 
Bello notes that the departure of the state "crowded out" rather than "crowded in" the 
domestic private sector. This has left peasant farmers more food insecure and governments 
more dependent on erratic flows of aid to mediate these insecurities.244 This has been in 
addition to the fact that sub-Saharan African peasants experience the trend of declining 
farm size in the face of inherently unstable "free" agricultural markets. Slow rates of 
economic growth, rapid population growth, and environmental degradation entail that 
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small-scale farming is still and essential livelihood element, but Africa has nonetheless been 
transformed from "a continent of land abundance in the first half of the twentieth century 
to one of increasing land scarcity by its end.,,245 These dynamics have resulted in increased 
livelihood diversification amongst peasants, but this nonetheless remains "highly 
opportunistic in nature, involving quick responses to market supply and demand.,,246 While 
rich and middle peasantries tend to diversify into non-farm business activities, such as trade, 
transport and vending, poor peasantries resort to casual wage work but remain "heavily 
reliant on subsistence crop production.,,247 The 2001 LADDER findings have shown that 
while diversification into non-farm activities for the rich and middle peasantry, this option 
rapidly diminishes for poor peasants who "are mired in poverty traps characterised by low 
asset status and persistent difficulty in achieving food security from own production, factors 
that intensify as the depths of poverty increase.,,248 The nature of livelihood diversification 
in many SSA countries is such that these option remain heavily dependent upon the vigour 
of the broader economy. In stagnant or recessionary periods such options remain absent. 
4.5 Conclusion 
It should not be assumed that commodification and agrarian change remain the only 
dynamics that engendering vulnerability. Various factors have played prominent roles in 
engendering significant levels of human and food insecurity within sub-Saharan Africa. 
Nonetheless, the overt manifestations of the process of deagrarianisation are a reduced 
ability, the difference between the actual and the potential, of rural peasantries "food and 
basic needs self-sufficiency, a decline in agricultural labour relative to non-agricultural 
labour in rural households ... a decrease in agricultural output per capita in the national 
economy relative to non-agricultural output ... These are all tendencies observable through-
out sub-Saharan Africa." 249 This insecurity is thus the mirrored reflection of capital 
accumulation's usurpation upon the peasantry, "as evidenced through vulnerability to 
coercion, insecurity of contract, low wages and the absence of social protections.,,250 The 
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process of deagrarianisation and depeasantisation thus remains a product of an indirect 
form of structural violence which separates the peasantry from "access to social wealth they 
have which is not mediated by competitive market and money as capital."251 This process is 
what Harvey labels "accumulation by dispossession."252 Combining the work of Lenin and 
Luxemburg, Harvey asserts that during the course of accumulation the peasantry 
experiences subjugation as a product of commodification and capitalism's attempt to 
"circumvent the pressures of overaccumulation"; the fundamental problem of a lack of 
viable opportunities for profitable investment.253 The process results in greater levels of 
social inequality via a wide range of processes which include lithe commodification and 
privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of the peasant populations ... " 254 
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Chapter 5: Structural Violence, Agrarian Change and Food Insecurity in Tanzania 
Sub-Saharan Africa remains characterised by the highest proportion of global food insecurity. 
According to the FAD, undernourishment is approximately 33 percent within the region.255 
Within the East African region food insecurity remains elevated relative to the rest of the 
region, with nearly 87 million individuals exposed to varying levels of undernourishment.256 
Most recent data places Tanzania's level of undernourishment at approximately 44 
percent. 257 Approximately 80 percent of residents, either directly or indirectly, still derive 
their livelihood from agriculture or pastoralism. 258 The costs of protein and energy 
malnutrition were calculated to be roughly 14 percent of the Tanzania's annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2002.259 Between 1992 and 2002 the number of individuals 
exposed to undernourishment increased from 9 to 15 million, while population by only 
increased by approximately 33 percent; an overall 7 percent increase in the level of 
undernourishment within the population.26o Within the above mentioned contextual setting, 
it is thus not surprising that there remains increased contestation surrounding the 
continued encroachment of agri-business for biofuel production within Tanzania. 
According to Sulle and Nelson, of central concern is the impact these encroachments have 
on the prices of food crops and land alienation of smallholder farmers; an exit option which 
remains particularly significant given levels of food insecurity.261 Concurrently, 4 million 
hectares of land have been requested for biofuel investment within Tanzania, of which 
640000 ha have been allocated, and only 100000 assigned formal occupancy rights.262 The 
subsequent debate nonetheless frames Tanzania's agrarian crisis within the historical 
process whereby its peasantry have experienced the adverse effects of commodification; a 
form of structural violence which has rendered high levels of food and human insecurity. 
The following section frames food security concerns through an historical account of 
commodification and exposure to structural violence within Tanzania. This subordination 
255 FAD. 2004. The State 0/ Food Insecurity in the World (Italy: FAD/UN) 
256 Ibid, pp. 35 
257 Ibid. 
258 Sulle, E. And Nelson. F. 2009. Bio/uels, Land Access and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania, pp. 35 
259 Ibid, pp. 12 
260 FAD. 2004. The State 0/ Food Insecurity in the World, pp. 35 












and domination of the Tanzanian peasantry has, and continues to emerge through particular 
state apparatus as well as vertically by social class divisions. 
5.1 The Agrarian Question in Tanzania and the Evolution of the Agrarian Crisis 
The agrarian question as it applies to the case of Tanzania can only be fully conceptualised 
by taking into account the historical process whereby the peasant mode of production has 
become increasingly disarticulated through forms of structural violence and continued 
commodification. The antecedents of this process have their roots in the colonial economy. 
Issa Shivji has argued that the conditions under which capitalism has penetrated the African 
state has resulted in a divergent form of capitalist development to the European case. 
During both pre- and post-interdependence eras, "while some ranks of the peasantry 
protect their interests by fraternising with the bureaucracy, the poor peasantry is exploited 
by both internal and external dominating classes."263 
5.1.1 The Colonial Origins of Agrarian Change 
Within Tanzania, the initiation of the process of commodification occurred with the 
introduction of cash crops into the Tanganyikan economy during German imperialism of the 
late 19th century and the subsequent period of British colonial rule. This resulted in the 
initial "reproductive squeezes" to which the peasantry was exposed; a dynamic which has 
become increasingly commandeering as the economy has become further integrated into 
the metropolitan capitalist structure.264 Imperialist capitalism of the colonial era served to 
destroy the peasantry's self-sufficiency and establish the peasantry as both a petty 
commodity producer and source of cheap labour. Via the process of constant integration 
into the global capitalist system, the peasantry becomes characterised by the two-fold 
division of his/her production: that of food crop for consumption, and that of wage-labour 
or cash crop production for sale. This twofold division under imperialist relationships is 
facilitated largely through the indirect forms of structural violence which place the peasant 












in a highly vulnerable position between surplus production for the capitalist enterprise and 
the ability to reproducing him/herself.265 
Following the removal of German settler farmers after World War I, the British economy 
became increasingly reliant on her colonies for agricultural imports. Prior to the outbreak of 
war, Britain's heavy reliance on American producers for cotton, sugar, tobacco, and other 
raw materials had led to a sizeable budget deficit and an increased debt to the United States 
following a period of steady economic decline from the latter 19th century. The colonial 
economies were thus essential for strengthening the Sterling currency and building up 
foreign exchange reserves. According to Marjorie Mbilinyi, these factors resulted in the 
emergence of colonial economies "increasingly centred on large scale private and public 
agriculture, and not on peasant production. This was neither natural nor voluntary ... "; and 
increasingly relied upon capitalist "hindrances to block the development of a more inward-
orientated and diversified economy ... "266 
The colonial impetus to usurp cash crop production on the peasantry occurred intensively 
during periods of economic crisis. Investment into peasant production remained all but 
absent until the 1950's, when it occurred largely as a response to the exigencies of the 
independence movement. The colonial state also made use of compulsory crop production 
laws. For example, during the interwar years cotton cultivation was compulsory in 
Tanzania's Musoma region.267 The use of excessive taxation, price fixing, and control of 
export marketing boards, geared peasants towards market-orientated cash crop production 
as well casual labour on plantation sites. Just prior to the outbreak of World War II, the 
British colonial authorities established The African Products (Control and Marketing) 
Ordinance which allowed Boards to monopolise export-crop marketing and cultivation.26B As 
a result, for example, African cotton producers in 1951 received half the producer price paid 
for cotton than that of non-Africans. Within Musoma, peasant cash crop producers were 
subject to a 50 percent taxation on cotton produced.269 
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The white settler movement post-1930 also necessitated the need for increased casual 
labour and land expropriation. Imperial state provisions of preferential prices, transport 
charges, subsidies, credit and private ownership were proved to settler producers alone. 
The vast majority of Africa producers within Tanzania were deprived of such benefits. 
Legislative and judicial barriers further prohibited the development of a rural Tanzanian 
agricultural capitalist class. By 1937, Tanzania's agricultural exports were split 44 to 56 
percent between African farmers and non-African corporations, respectively. 270 This was 
largely facilitated by the merchants temporary monopoly of knowledge of values in both 
societies, allowing for non-equivalent exchange, super-profits and the entrenchment of 
monopoly capital.271 
By 1956 the amount of alienated land in Tanzania was approximately three million acres, 
with one million acres expropriated between 1949 and 1956.272 This was facilitated through 
the British Land Ordinance Act of 1923, which declared all land as public and Crown Land. 
Corporations in tea, sisal and cotton increasingly monopolised within the Tanzanian agro-
industry- as allocation of land was given preference to conglomerates on the basis of a 
plantation economic model. At the point of independence the Tanzanian economy was so 
dependent upon its agro-industry base that this sector of the economy alone accounted 
for "59 percent of all construction business, 48 percent of machinery and equipment, and 54 
percent of capital assets."273 Fluctuations in its commodity prices were thus likely to have 
severe implications for the economy. Post-independence, the abolition of the 10 percent 
Commonwealth preferential import relationship by the British government led to significant 
economic regression within Tanzania. The removal of these colonial preferential trade 
relations combined with such a fabricated and specialised economy contributed to 
significant trade imbalances. Tanzania's trade imbalance, as a result increased from 36,1 
million Tanzanian shillings (TZ5) in 1969 to 6142.2 million (TZS) in 1980.274 
The role of compradorial elites in facilitating this process is also noteworthy. The centre 
within the periphery was largely established via the imperialist alliances with the "ruling 
strata of the previous social structure, with the feudal lords and the trading and money-
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lending bourgeoisie against the majority of the people."275 Within Tanzania this relationship 
was institutionalised within the creation of the Native Authority Ordinance, endowing native 
authorities with the task of ensuring that African peasants would cultivate a certain 
minimum of cash and food cropS.276 
Shivji, quoting Sweezy, states that the within much of colonial Africa liThe consequence is 
the swelling of the ranks of the peasantry, increased pressures on the land and the 
deterioration of the productivity and living standards of the agricultural masses who 
constitute by far the largest section of the colonial populations."277 Within Tanzania the 
rural bourgeoisie remained largely absent. The development of commodity exchange served 
to proletarianise the peasantry and manufacture an underdeveloped capitalist society.278 It 
is under these circumstances that the colonial state was able to engage in surplus value 
extraction from the peasantry. This initial form of structural violence also served in 
increasing the labour share devoted to market orientated behaviour, and diminishing that 
which was devoted to family or use-value consumption.279 Peasant surplus production, 
production above the necessary level for consumption, remained low or regressive. Low 
productivity via a denial to improved means of production as well as continued land 
expropriation served to define the peasantry as the source of surplus for agri-business 
usurpation. As cash crop or wage labour became increasingly necessary for livelihood 
purposes, peasants diverted away from producing a variety of food produce to one or two 
staple foods; in favour of cash crop production. According to Shivji, general impetus within 
Tanzania was to rely of the low nutritional value of starchy foods such as cassava which 
required limited labour time. The result was the "direct relationship between the 
inadequate and coarse diet of the peasantry and the introduction and intensification of 
export crops.,,280 The declining terms of trade and volatility of the agricultural commodities 
market necessitated that at times even food crops had to be sold to meet livelihood needs. 
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5.1.2 Post-Independence Peasant Exploitation under Ujamaa and Villigization 
Diversification of the economy occurred more fervently post-independence in 1961. 
Nonetheless, the process of deagrarianisation and the exploitation of the peasantry has 
largely persisted due to a continued emphasis on export crop production. This is despite the 
fact that prominence was placed on rural areas for Tanzania's socio-economic development. 
Under Nyerere's socialist mandate of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the Tanganyikan 
African National Union (TANU) government, based on World Bank recommendations, 
sought to "transform" and "improve" rural productive capacity. 281 Subsequently, the 
Ujamaa and Villigization policies were implemented in 1963 and 1974, respectively. In many 
respects, the Ujamaa, defined as the voluntary resettlement of people into planned 
settlements, and the Villigization policy, defined as the mandatory resettlement process, led 
to increased stagnation in the economy and a further widening of the gap between urban 
and rural living standards.282 During this period the state, und r its socialist and moderniSing 
mandate, nationalised its authority over land. The general motivation was nonetheless to 
resettle significant numbers of small rural producers into designated villages, where they 
would engage in modern farming techniques geared towards self-reliance and improved 
production, under the supervision of state officials.283 
The Ujamma policy of 1966-1973 entailed that by 1974, 5000 villages had been established 
incorporating two and a half million rural smallholder producers.284 The failure of these 
systems was largely attributable to the manner in which it continue to operate through the 
land tenure systems and marketing board structures of the colonial era. In many regards the 
controls exercised by boards were "more elaborative, comprehensive and authoritarian.,,285 
In accordance with local customary laws and land tenure systems peasants were still 
required to cultivate a certain mix of designated cash and food crops. Even in 1985, a breach 
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of such by-laws was considered to be a criminal offense subject to a fine of 200 TZS or a 
minimum oftwo month incarceration.28G 
The improvement and transformation policies were financed primarily through conditional 
loans under the auspices of the World Bank. Mbilinyi and Bernstein have shown that World 
Bank funding in this regard was geared primarily towards export crop production and large-
scale agricultural parastatals.287 Bernstein asserts that the World Bank's Dar es Salaam office, 
with its linkages to Ministries and parastatals, operated "effectively as a state apparatus in 
its own right... and contributed significantly to the enlargement and centralisation of 
Tanzania's version ofthe 'modernising state.1II288 
The de-emphasis on food production served to establish Tanzania as a net-food-importing 
country throughout the 1970's and 1980's. By 1985, grain imports has increased to half a 
million tons per annum, while smallholder cultivation occupied only five percent of the total 
arable landmass. In many respects this has been part of both the colonial and post-colonial 
states emphasis towards containing the peasantry.289 The effects hereof have been the 
peasantry's greater dependence on the foreign market for the marketing their produce, 
provision of inputs, and the supply of food.290 
The Arusha Declaration of 1967 served to increase nationalization of the state within all 
section of the economy and further entrench compradorial elites under the facade of self-
reliance and a populist-socialist reign. According to Townsend, the subjugation of the 
Tanzanian peasantry served the interests of merchant capital and Tanzania's petit-
bourgeoisies, allowing both to maintain a monopoly foothold in the economy through 
mechanisms of state organs and cooperative institutions. These institutions, supposedly 
essential to the transformative and improvement agenda, nonetheless contributed 
significantly towards further social differentiation and the cheap labour pool.291 In essence 
the petit-bourgeoisie continued to control the means of production well into the post-
independence era. 
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Despite efforts to increase communal production, the Ujamma policy did not result in 
substantial improvements. For a small proportion of the peasantry, the effects of 
commodification allowed them to move into commercial and merchant activities. These 
kuleks nonetheless increasingly extended commodity relations within the rural economy. 
The state increasingly monopolised in terms of dictating the price paid for produce (after 
subtracting the costs for the various inputs provided), acting as middlemen in the sale of 
communal produce and maintaining the difference in value exchange that had existed 
during the colonial era. District official's ability to dictate the amount of produce to be 
allocated for family consumption entailed that peasants slowly resorted back to non-
communal forms of subsistence farming, where village officials were unable to gain access 
to such produce.292 Peasants also attempted to redirect the marketing of their produce 
through the creation of co-operative organizations which were answerable to the peasants 
themselves rather than the state. 293 
The peasantry's increased wavering towards the Ujamma programme entailed that in 1973 
the state's emphasis radically shifted towards coerced forms of village resettlement. 
Between 1973 and 1975 nine million traditional peasants were resettled, often coercively, 
into large, planned village settlements based on the rational that it would allow the 
government to provide the rural population with essential social services.294 By 1975 the 
marketing co-operatives were also abolished in an effort to re-establish the state's 
monopoly over the marketing of export crops. The subsequent emergence of Crop 
Authorities brought the state back into direct contact with the peasantry, allowing the state 
bourgeoisie to re-establish its control. Maghimbi remarks that the largest problem with the 
Crop Authorities was that they were "bureaucratic organizations set up to meet the 
interests of politicians."295 The largest of these was the National Milling Corporation, which 
possessed the sole rights to import and export major grains including maize, rice, and wheat. 
Crop Authorities also became increasingly dependent upon fiscal subsidies to fund their 
often inefficient and cumbersome and inefficient setups This in turn fuelled higher levels of 
inflation, discouraging many peasants from producing cash crops all together, "since the 
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value of money they got was not worth it./296 Additionally, the Villagisation programme 
entailed that for 60 percent of the population, each individual was allocated 1,43 ha of land 
under the Villigization programme, despite the fact that Tanzania's low population density 
allows for 7,27 ha per capita.297 
Mapulo remarks that: 
Villigization can therefore be seen as the culmination of colonialist efforts to 
restructure rural economic life in order to facilitate exploitation and domination 
of the rural masses by international capitalism ... only the existence of centralised 
institutions that directly control the peasants can achieve these objectives.298 
The continued siphoning of surplus value under imperialist domination, mediated through 
various local classes and state institutions had increasingly detrimental effects on the 
peasantry's food crop purchases. For example, between 1978-1979 maize purchases 
decreased from 223 000 tons to 105000 tons; rice from 52000 to 5000 tons; and millet and 
sorghum to nil from 40000 and 50000, respectively.299 Upon the era of independence 
malnutrition was recorded at 30 percent, by 1983 it averaged 60 percent.300 Between 1964 
and 1977 the peasants' terms of trade declined by 24 percent.301 0verspecialisation in 
export crop production entailed that in 1980, following the second oil crisis, Tanzania's food 
imports took more foreign exchange earnings than all four previous years.302 Moreover, the 
state's ability to finance these import increasingly came under strain due to its acute 
reliance on favourable commodity climates for its agricultural exports. Crisis within the rural 
economy increasingly resulted in increased levels of rural to urban migration, and 
deagrarianisation, placing further pressures on the rural area to feed burgeoning urban 
centres.303 The ability of peasants to withdraw from the sphere of commodity production 
into that of food crop production also rapidly diminished during this period as the peasantry 
became more specialised in types of commodity production. Bernstein cites World Bank 
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figures when he argues that figures on peasant production and income by region show that 
the ability to withdraw into use-value-production corresponds with areas within Tanzania 
where commodity production remains least developed.304 
5.1.3 The Structural Adjustment Era of Deagrarianisation and Fast Crops 
The imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAP's) from the mid-1980's to the 
mid-1990's had a drastic effect on the peasantry and food crop production. By 1980 the 
Tanzanian government had reached a critical point, unable to finance essential import, 
especially food.30S The government was thus forced to enter into negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These negotiations led to several SAP's, including the 
National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) and the 1986 Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP). Under the auspices of international financial institutions and other 
donors, Tanzania's budget of 1984/85 sought to undertake significant adjustments to the 
agricultural sector. These included: a doubling in agricultural expenditure, the removal of 
consumer subsidies, an increase in agricultural producer prices, and a substantial 25 percent 
devaluation of the national currency.306 The IMF, World Bank, and other IFl's placed 
increased emphasis on deregulating the economy and reducing the role of parastatals 
within the agricultural sector. Under the ERP the NMC was reduced to a manger of food 
security concerns and a buyer of last resort. It ability to enforce control prices and 
marketing within the state was also abolished. 
Significant contestation remains around the success of both the ERP and its successors, the 
ERPII 1989/82 and Tanzania Agricultural Adjustment Programme (TANAA). The IMF 
regarded the policy as a success, stating that under its mandate "agricultural production 
increased considerably, spurred by improved weather conditions, higher producer prices, 
the enhanced flexibility of the marketing system for domestic food crops, and generally 
improved availability of agricultural inputs.,,307 By 1993 these perceptions changed. Donors 
became unsatisfied with the supposed superficial implementation of the reforms, citing "the 
shortcomings in tax reforms, the large public deficit, excessive monetary expansion, and the 
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failure of agricultural cooperatives to reduce their outstanding debts with the banks" as 
factors undermining the liberalisation process.308 Ponte states that with hindsight, statistical 
evidence of the liberalisation process produced by the IFI's was "extremely shaky." For 
example, by 1994 it is possible that maize food production was overestimated by as much as 
45 percent.309 The concern for the current debate is nonetheless the impact this period had 
on the Tanzanian peasantry. While deregulation under SAP's did indeed facilitate the 
abstraction of parastatal monopolies of the petit-bourgeoisie, it is also argued to have 
exposed the peasantry to new vulnerabilities. 
Goodman and Watts argue that the enforcement of neo-liberal policies of the SAP era 
marked the emergence of the open-door policy to international market forces. The period 
also marked the hiatus between a surge in agricultural imports, particularly food, and a 
decline in African export as a percentage of global agricultural trade. Implicit within these 
forces is the process of global deagrarianisation, whereby the peasants remaining 
"subsistence orientation and relatively low yielding, unstandardised agriculture and high 
transport casts, was the antithesis of the growing dominance of agro industrial production 
in the world's agricultural trade commodity circuits.,,310 As a result these livelihood activities 
ofthe poorer and middle peasantries are increasingly threatened. 
The removal of the remaining agricultural subsidies during this period, albeit that this was 
previously a mechanism of class contro" is also cited as a factor that adversely affected 
Tanzania's peasantry. It is important to note that despite liberalisation, the Tanzanian 
peasantry still remained under the legal mandate of minimum by-laws for export crop 
production. The result of the removal of subsidies (for pesticides, fertilisers, and seeds) 
entailed that Tanzania's peasantry was subject to uncertain market environments and 
greater international competition. Input prices rapidly increased as the private traders 
which replaced the parastatals were less capable to reach and supply rural producers. 
Yields and incomes as a result dramatically decreased. In addition, under the mandate of the 
SAP's, the Primary Cooperative Unions (PCU) only provided access to credit for fertilizers 
and other inputs to be used on export crop cultivation. 311 African petty commodity 
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producers in general were also exposed to increased competition from modernised Asian 
plantations.312 
In response to these dynamics the Tanzanian peasantry resorted to the cultivation of fast 
crops, which require less expensive inputs. These include beans, cabbage, tomatoes, 
bananas and coconuts. The problem however was that fast crops have a tendency to 
deteriorate quicker after harvest, and have to be sold at what the market price dictates at 
the time of harvest. In addition, prices for fast crops have a tendency to be less predictable 
than slow crops.313 As a result, for example, Mung'ong'o has shown that annual mean 
household income experienced a 71 percent decline in Tanzania's Njombe district between 
1979 and 1992.314 
The result of a decline in income as a result of liberalisation has entailed the emergence of 
landless agrarian classes, as peasant farmers with small acreage have resorted to "selling or 
renting of their land out to larger-scale farmers and turning to agricultural wage labour or 
non-farm activities.,,315 According to Madula's study of Tanzania's Mwanza region, 50 
percent of non-agricultural activity started in and post-1990, while another 30 percent in 
the 1980'S.316 
While this is not synonymous with pover y and food insecurity, it does indeed result in an 
increased degree of vulnerability for the peasantry with regards to the aforementioned 
threats. The emergence of a dual livelihood strategy requires two very different skills sets. 
Bryceson's Deagrarianisatio  and Rural Employment (DARE) research findings argue that the 
peasantry, under income diversification, is required to incessantly move between relying 
more prevalently on the former or the latter based on marginal changes in profit.317 While a 
stratum of the peasantry do achieve success from diversification, non-agricultural livelihood 
pursuits are subject to a great deal of inherent risk. Bryceson states that this is due to the 
manner in which non-agricultural employment for the peasantry is often "capital· 
degenerating in nature" and exposes the peasantry to greater "inflationary incursions.,,318 
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Therefore, the reliance on subsistence fallback remains strong and important. However, the 
commercialization of rural life under liberalisation policies of the 1980's and 1990's has 
precipitated that production-for-use is subject to higher cash requirements for farming, 
increasing food insecurity vulnerabilities.319 
The subjugation of the peasantry has also been compounded by Tanzania's dual land tenure 
systems. land tenure remains a contestable dynamic within the literature concerning 
Africa's agrarian question. The antecedents of this dynamic stem from the method in which 
land was allocated for settler production during the colonial epoch, and the manner in 
which this system of exclusion contributed to the creation of a landless class that remains at 
the margins of Africa's agro-industrial base. 
According to Maghimbi, in essence: 
... the distortion of land property relations, including the issues of land 
concentration and exclusion, the expansion of private landed property, and the 
deepening of extroverted capitalist relations of agrarian production, in the 
context of food insecurity, increased food imports (and aid dependence), the 
continued decline of the value of agrarian exports, and the collapse of Africa's 
nascent agro-industrial base, define the significance of land in the political 
economy of Africa's development.32o 
Sulle and Emmanuel state that during the 1980's the shift towards neo-liberal policies 
resulted in large increases in land acquisitions by local, national and foreign elites. Such 
acquisitions occurred in a "context where the administration of land had been centralised 
progressively in an increasingly inefficient state bureaucracy and past administrative 
measures have led to widespread confusion with regards to land tenure patterns.,,321 
According to Cotula, agricultural investment in Africa in general is plagued by a lack of 
"[institutional] mechanisms to protect local rights and take account of local interests, 
livelihoods and welfare." Furthermore, the position of the local population is critically 
undermined by a "lack of transparency and of checks and balances in contract negotiations" 
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as well as "corruption and deals that do not maximise the public interest.,,322 Customary 
tenure, developed under the colonial divide-and-rule imperative, remains embedded within 
the land tenure system of Tanzania, despite the era of MLAR. Concurrently, Tanzanian's land 
tenure is still managed under the mandate the Village Land Act 1999 and the Land Act 1999. 
The former allows village council offices to grant occupancy rights, while the latter places all 
land in Tanzania under public control of the presidency. 
According to Sara Berry, commercialisation of land thus occurs "within the (shifting) 
parameters of "traditional", which makes contractualisation and social negotiation difficult 
to separate from each other.,,323 In such a context, the monopoly of rights to allocate 
occupancy becomes especially controversial. This is because an equitable entree to agrarian 
resources and state support to smallholder producers is essential in reversing food 
insecurity trends. Shivji argues that Tanzania's current land tenure system thus reflects 
remarkable similarities to the Land Ordinance the colonial period.324 The monopolistic right 
of state officials to allocate land is argued to be the extension of the compradorial role 
played by the state under the era of neo-liberal agro-industrial relations. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The above section has attempted to demarcate the historical manner by which Tanzania's 
peasantry have been exploited. The emergence of food insecurity within Tanzania can be 
seen as largely the result of indirect forms of structural violence. The inability of the peasant 
to resort to production for use, and the declining livelihood thereof is the result of the 
contradiction of agrarian relationships under the colonial, post-colonial and neo-liberal era. 
The food security concept highlights the demise of subsistence livelihood as a social threat 
which smallholder producers are exposed to. However, through a materialist account of 
Tanzania's agrarian question can these social threats be fully acknowledged. Addressed 
from the materialist perspective, the inherent continuation of human insecurity experienced 
by the Tanzanian peasantry remains a product of lithe relations of exploitation engendered 
by imperialist domination of the small peasant, mediated through local classes and the 
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state.,,325 The peasantry's entitlement to specific livelihood patterns is slowly threatened as 
the peasantry is integrated into agro-industrial relations. The result is increased livelihood 
diversification, which is subject to greater degrees of vulnerability to food insecurity. 











Chapter 6: Conclusion 
As a paradigm human security operates as is a "worldview that defines for its holder, the 
nature of the world and the individuals place in it."326 It is conceded that the paradigm is not 
without its flaws. The concept of human and food security remained mired by contestation 
due to the broad inclusive nature of these terms. Furthermore, it remains difficult to 
delineate the core values that comprise these terms. Nonetheless, the advent of the 
paradigm remains inextricably linked to the context within which it has emerged. The post-
Cold War era and the proliferation of interconnectedness precipitates that the notion of the 
threat has to be expounded. The timeless essence of the traditional account of security, 
with such emphasis on rationality, state-centrism, power, and anarchy seems inept within 
the post-Cold War security arena. The paradigm of human security, and its constitutive parts 
has emerged to fill this scholarly vacuum. In the words of Thomas Kuhn, the paradigm's 
strength lies in nature of being open-ended enough to answer new questions. However, the 
scientific community is always reluctant to fully abandon the preceding paradigm, bound by 
emotion and obstinate intellectual commitment. As such, a full paradigm shift is yet to occur. 
The argument posited in the preceding paper has attempted to buttress the paradigm 
through the use of critical theory. Accordingly, human and food insecurity was argued to be 
synonymous with the manifestation of structural violence. Galtung's notion of structural 
violence offers a theoretical framework for the notion of structural inequalities and the 
manner in which they manifest into structural inequalities. The argument attempted to 
posits a strong case for the conceptualization of the causal dynamics and objective 
consequences of human insecurity in terms of repressive structures; which, in turn, lead to 
highly in disparate social structures and cyclical reinforcement of the structure itself. If the 
focus is on the objective consequences rather than the subjective intentions which inhibit 
the "potential realizations" of individuals, then human insecurity must be understood in 
terms of the structural elements of the interaction structure. The use of Galtung's structural 
theory of imperialism model highlights the manner by which "professional imperialism is 
based on structural rather than direct violence.,,327 The role of class exploitation engendered 
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between core and periphery nations via exchange across varying degree of processing 
power underlies this structural arrangement. 
The paper subsequently attempted to delineate the structural elements of the interaction 
structure as it pertains to food security concerns. Biofuel demand and the threat it poses to 
peasantry livelihoods must be placed in the broader context of the history of agrarian 
relations within the continent. Within sub-Saharan African the peasantry has been slowly 
subject to the increased commodification of agrarian relations. The paper conceptualised 
food insecurity as a result of Kautsky's nation of the disappearance thesis, which remains a 
process that is subject to countervailing tendencies. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the marginal 
persistence of the peasantry may be regarded as what Alain de Janvry calls "functional 
dualism", the persistence of the peasantry to fuel the capitalist enterprise via cheap labour 
for surplus-value.328 While food insecurity is subject to intervening variable, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that food insecurity remains primarily the product of the 
commodification of agrarian relations. According to Bryceson, the result is the overt 
manifestation of deagrarianization and the difference between the actual and the potential, 
of rural peasantries' "food and basic needs self-sufficiency, a decline in agricultural labour 
relative to non-agricultural labour in rural households ... a decrease in agricultural output per 
capita in the national economy relative to non-agricultural output ... These are all tendencies 
observable through-out sub-Saharan Africa.,,329 
Central concepts of peasant analysis in Marxian political economy stress the importance of 
the social relations of production, the mode of production, social reproduction and surplus 
value. Social relations of production determine the livelihood of different groups in any 
society. Accordingly, peasant livelihood vulnerability remain a product of who possess the 
effective control over productive resources, and what happens to the product created by 
those resources. 330 Social relations of production refer to the access various social groups 
have to these means of production, and subsequently the "the control of what they produce 
in society at large." 331 Under capitalist relations of production the process of 
commoditization serves to destroy the natural economy and change the "fundamental 
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social changes in the conditions of production.,,332 Within Tanzania, it is plausible to see the 
manifestation of chronic levels of malnutrition as the product of the commodification of 
agrarian relations. Under colonialism, the post-independence socialist mandates, and neo-
liberal liberalisation mandates the peasantry has become increasingly integrated into the 
global agro-industrial system. Under all three eras the imperative has been to move away 
from the "inefficient" methods of peasant production towards market orientated and 
modernising imperatives. Within Tanzania, a historical materialist framework of analysis was 
utilised to demonstrate the manner by which the peasantry has been rendered vulnerable. 
The production for use livelihood pattern became increasingly unsustainable as the 
peasantry was exposed to the various reproductive squeezes engendered under capitalist 
relations. The food security concept is thus placed in context of the broader relationship of 
peasant agrarian relations. It is through this critical theory lens that the paradigm reveals its 
true coherency, unveiling the structural inequalities which render the individual insecure. 
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